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BAD BRIEFS, BAD LAW, BAD MARKETS: 
DOCUMENTING THE POOR QUALITY OF PLAINTIFFS’ 
BRIEFS, ITS IMPACT ON THE LAW, AND THE MARKET 
FAILURE IT REFLECTS  
Scott A. Moss* 
ABSTRACT 
For a major field, employment discrimination suffers surprisingly low-
quality plaintiffs’ lawyering. This Article details a study of several hundred 
summary judgment briefs, finding as follows: (1) the vast majority of plaintiffs’ 
briefs omit available caselaw rebutting key defense arguments, many falling 
far below basic professional standards with incoherent writing or no 
meaningful research; (2) low-quality briefs lose at over double the rate of 
good briefs; and (3) bad briefs skew caselaw evolution, because even 
controlling for win-loss rate, bad plaintiffs’ briefs far more often yield 
decisions crediting debatable defenses. These findings are puzzling. In a major 
legal service market, how can clients persistently choose bad lawyers, lawyers 
persistently perform so poorly, and judicial and ethics authorities tolerate this 
situation? Answers include poor client information, ethics authorities’ limited 
ability or will to discipline bad lawyers, and two troubling lawyer behaviors: 
(1) overoptimistically entering the field without realizing, until suffering losses, 
that it requires intensive research and writing; and (2) knowingly litigating on 
the cheap, rather than expending briefing effort to maximize case value, 
because contingency-paid lawyers may profitably run “mills” and live off 
quick, small settlements. A survey of the worst brief-writers’ law firms hints 
that the problem may be a mix of the former (nonspecialists in over their 
heads) and the latter (knowingly litigating cheaply). This Article offers the 
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following reforms that, while no cure-all for a problem stemming from 
stubborn market forces, could help: (1) expanding educational efforts, 
including law school experiential learning, bar resource-sharing, and bar 
exam reform; (2) enhancing client access to information on lawyers by 
liberalizing ethics rules restricting expertise claims and public access to court 
files; (3) broadening the supply of competent lawyers by liberalizing rules 
restricting the standing to sue of discrimination “testers” and ethics rules on 
corporations owning law firms; and (4) toughening ethics enforcement against 
the worst offenders, who almost all go unpunished now. 
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“We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us”—Walt Kelly1 
INTRODUCTION 
Employment discrimination features surprisingly low-quality plaintiffs’ 
lawyering for a field that reflects important federal policy2 and, at six to ten 
percent of the federal docket, is one of the most common case types.3 This 
Article details a study showing that, on the summary judgment motions that 
 
 1 WALT KELLY, POGO: WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS US (1972). The saying classically applies 
whenever advocates hurt their cause, as plaintiffs’ lawyers do with the bad briefs this Article analyzes. 
 2 See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401–02 (1968) (per curiam) (noting that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 “vindicat[es] a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority”). 
 3 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: 
From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 103–04 (2009) (finding that employment discrimination, 
which was previously the most common federal case type, is currently the third most common federal case 
type). 
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dispose of employment cases with “almost Pavlovian . . . frequency,”4 the vast 
majority of plaintiffs’ briefs omit available caselaw rebutting key defense 
arguments and lose at more than double the rate of competent briefs. These bad 
briefs cause broad harms: to the plaintiffs suffering poor representation, to the 
caselaw resulting from poorly opposed motions, and to the lawyers 
themselves—at least those unaware that their cases were doomed from the 
start. This finding raises a series of questions as to how clients persistently 
choose bad lawyers, lawyers persistently perform poorly, and judicial and 
ethics authorities tolerate this state of affairs. 
Part I explains this Article’s study. Part I.A describes how this Article uses 
the “same-actor” defense to test plaintiffs’ briefing quality because the defense 
is the topic of dueling caselaw. Numerous summary judgment decisions credit 
this defense, finding that a strong inference of nondiscrimination arises when 
the same actor who hired the plaintiff was also the one who fired her; yet in the 
same circuits, other decisions reject the defense. This intra-circuit split makes 
for an excellent objective test of plaintiffs’ summary judgment brief quality: if 
a defendant’s brief cites cases crediting the same-actor defense, there is no 
excuse for the plaintiff’s opposing brief not to cite caselaw within the same 
circuit rejecting the defense. 
Part I.B then details the study’s methodology. The case sample consists of 
cases in which employment discrimination defendants’ summary judgment 
briefs on Westlaw argue the same-actor defense. The study was limited to 
selected federal district courts with (a) an intra-circuit split on the same-actor 
defense and (b) enough case volume for a large sample. The data set also 
contains the plaintiffs’ opposing summary judgment briefs, both those on 
 
 4 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” 
and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 
1052–53 (2003) (noting that courts increasingly dismiss age discrimination and certain other cases on 
summary judgment). The increase in summary judgment grants spans all employment discrimination types, not 
just age. See id. at 1068–69. See generally Vivian Berger et al., Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling 
Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45, 55 tbl.1 (2005) (finding that in 
selected districts, summary judgment was granted in 63.6% of employment discrimination cases); Michael 
Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 559 (2001) (“[A] . . . 
higher percentage (15.85 percent) of employment cases [are] resolved through pretrial motions than . . . either 
insurance (12.98 percent) or personal injury cases (9.4 percent).”); Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George 
Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Hon. Michael Baylson, 1–2 (June 15, 2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/ 
pdf.nsf/lookup/sujufy06.pdf/$file/sujufy06.pdf (finding that, of all summary judgment motions in 2006, in 
seventy-eight federal district courts, “[a]pproximately 60 percent . . . are granted in whole or in part,” while 
“[o]ver 70 percent of the summary judgment motions in employment discrimination cases are granted in whole 
or in part”). 
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Westlaw and those on only the PACER5 repository of federal court filings. Of 
the several hundred briefs reviewed, 101 complete briefings allowed 
examination of the plaintiff’s brief and ensuing summary judgment decision (if 
any), whether a Westlaw-reported decision or an unreported decision on 
PACER. Others have studied and criticized brief quality anecdotally6 or have 
noted plaintiffs’ perceptions of poor lawyering.7 But no studies systematically 
review a large database of lawyer filings, likely because that was previously 
infeasible: only now, several years after e-filing became universal in the mid-
2000s, has a large sample of digitized briefs become available for analysis.8 
Part II details the following three findings. First, as Part II.A explains, most 
plaintiffs’ briefs lack caselaw any competent brief would have. Even where in-
circuit caselaw rejects the same-actor argument that the defendant’s brief 
made, and that many courts credit in granting summary judgment, over twice 
as many plaintiffs’ briefs do not cite that caselaw (72%) as do (28%). Many 
such briefs fall far below basic professional standards in other ways: most fail 
to respond to the same-actor defense at all, not even on the facts; many feature 
oddly incoherent prose; and many cite long-abrogated caselaw or offer only 
boilerplate recitations of the most basic Supreme Court precedents—indicating 
the lawyer did no actual legal research for the main, and fatal, motion in the 
case. The low quality of plaintiffs’ briefs has not previously been documented 
in an academic study, but is a well-known fact to judges concerned about 
summary judgment practice.9 
 
 5 PACER, the “Public Access to Court Electronic Records,” allows lawyers to e-file documents and the 
public access to case files; each district has its own PACER page. See, e.g., CM/ECF Filer or PACER Login, 
U.S. DISTRICT CT. S. DISTRICT N.Y., https://ecf.nysd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl (last visited Aug 14, 2013). 
 6 See, e.g., Stephen J. Dwyer et al., How to Write, Edit, and Review Persuasive Briefs: Seven Guidelines 
from One Judge and Two Lawyers, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 417, 418–19 (2008) (criticizing and citing common 
briefing errors); Judith D. Fischer, Bareheaded and Barefaced Counsel: Courts React to Unprofessionalism in 
Lawyers’ Papers, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1997) (analyzing briefs with a wide range of legal and 
writing errors). 
 7 Ellen Berrey et al., Situated Justice: A Contextual Analysis of Fairness and Inequality in Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 46 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1, 21 (2012) (finding from survey data that roughly one-fourth 
of employment discrimination plaintiffs “feel their attorneys were corrupt”—numerous plaintiffs “recount 
serious mistakes their lawyers made and other forms of incompetence,” and “mention ways . . . their lawyers 
disappointed them by giving bad advice [or] making mistakes”). 
 8 See supra note 5. 
 9 In response to a presentation of this Article’s early, partial data, two federal district judges admitted 
agreeing with its diagnosis of bad briefs. “There are a lot of what I will gently call ‘underrepresented’ litigants 
whose responses to summary judgment motions . . . are often not what they ought to be to assist district judges 
in reaching more accurate results,” Judge Lee Rosenthal said; but, she added, “I said that more nicely than the 
article.” Lee Rosenthal, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court, S.D. Tex., Remarks during Panel I: A View from the Bench—
The Judges’ Perspective on Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases at the New York Law 
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Second, as Part II.B details, while bad brief-writers almost always lose, 
good brief-writers do not. Many have documented that discrimination cases 
lose on summary judgment at high rates.10 Not previously documented, but 
shown by this Article, is that while bad brief-writers lose summary judgment at 
a remarkably high rate (86%), good brief-writers do not (42%). The former’s 
loss rate may reflect bad writing or bad case selection (bad briefers likely 
assess cases badly too); but either way, good lawyers do not suffer the 
unusually high loss rates for which employment discrimination law has 
become notorious. 
Third, as Part II.C details, bad briefs impact judicial reasoning, skewing the 
caselaw. When a defendant briefs the same-actor defense and the ensuing 
decision mentions the defense, whether that decision credits the defense 
depends on whether the plaintiff rebutted it: when the plaintiff did rebut it, 
30% of decisions accept the defense while 70% reject it; when the plaintiff did 
not rebut, 86% of decisions accept the defense while 14% reject it. So even if a 
bad brief does not affect the outcome of a particular case (those plaintiffs 
might have lost anyway), it affects future case outcomes by skewing the 
caselaw toward defendants. 
Part III then discusses several puzzling questions posed by this Article’s 
finding that incompetent lawyering dominates a major field of law—a 
discussion largely absent from prior literature on briefing quality, which ably 
assesses writing but tends not to address broader problems that pervasively bad 
lawyering indicates. 
First, how can clients persistently choose failed service providers, 
equivalent to car buyers choosing rickety Yugos or exploding Pintos over 
Hondas or Toyotas? Part III.A diagnoses the problem as imperfect information: 
clients are (a) non-repeat players, (b) in a market requiring specialized 
knowledge, (c) where performance outcome measures are elusive, given how 
few cases yield public verdicts and how hard briefs are for laypeople to access 
 
School Law Review Symposium: Trial by Jury or Trial by Motion? Summary Judgment, Iqbal, and 
Employment Discrimination (Aug. 14, 2013), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8c8rrIeRpxc& 
feature=youtu.be (last visited May 13, 2013) (comments at 15:41). Retired Judge Nancy Gertner was more 
blunt: pro-defense doctrines trace in part, she agreed, to “the incompetent lawyers” whose losses may “feed 
back on the rest” of the cases. Nancy Gertner, Retired Judge, U.S. Dist. Court, D. Mass., Remarks during 
Panel III: The Interplay of Pleading Standards and Summary Judgment at the New York Law School Law 
Review Symposium: Trial by Jury or Trial by Motion? Summary Judgment, Iqbal, and Employment 
Discrimination (Apr. 23, 2012), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iA2PorODJZk&feature= 
youtu.be (last visited Aug. 14, 2013) (comments at 1:47:17). 
 10 See supra note 4. 
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or analyze. Legal services markets do not readily drive out bad performance; 
they are less like a restaurant market, to which people never return after bad 
experiences, than like a market for retirement planning that is complex and 
utilized only once. 
Second, even if bad client choices are explicable, why would contingency-
paid lawyers keep filing cases they litigate badly and overwhelmingly lose—
the equivalent of a factory churning out products it cannot profitably sell? Part 
III.B discusses two competing answers. Part III.B.1 notes that perhaps bad 
lawyers do not stay in the field; perhaps the number of experts simply is 
swamped by hordes of unqualified lawyers entering briefly, then leaving after 
losses. On this view, employment cases are a siren song for nonexperts who 
mistakenly think this complex, writing-intensive field entails only going to trial 
on a claim of injustice. Part III.B.2 suggests a darker explanation: in certain 
contingency-fee cases, litigating with ethically proper diligence (heavy 
discovery, research, writing, etc.) may maximize client recovery yet decrease 
lawyer profitability. Expending minimal effort to procure few wins, many 
small settlements, and many summary judgment losses may be profit-
maximizing for lawyers, despite yielding disappointing average values for 
clients and an increased pool of pro-defense precedent that decreases the future 
pool of winnable cases. A principal–agent problem thus drives a wedge 
between client and lawyer interests in fields featuring (a) contingency fees, (b) 
complex issues requiring high effort, and (c) modest recoveries typically in the 
five to six figures. Part III.B.3 reviews the best and worst lawyers’ practice 
areas to assess these two theories. 
Third, even if persistent bad lawyering is explicable, why do sanction-
wielding judges reading incompetent briefs, and ethics panels that discipline 
irresponsible lawyers, let such lawyering continue without consequences? Part 
III.C notes the difficulty of aggressive ethics enforcement without (a) raising 
the cost of legal services, potentially worsening the problem of inadequate 
competent supply, (b) requiring murky assessments of brief quality sure to be 
hotly disputed by accused lawyers, and (c) demanding unrealistic effort by 
understaffed judges and by ethics panels often staffed by volunteers busy with 
their own careers. 
Part IV proposes varied measures to redress this state of affairs, but it 
begins on two darker notes in Part IV.A. First, not all blame for crediting 
debatable defenses and generating high dismissal rates lies with the bar; 
caselaw shows that some judges just get it wrong, eagerly granting summary 
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judgment in defiance of Rule 56 standards that are too established to blame the 
lawyers. Second, any specific reforms cannot fully eliminate a problem that 
derives partly from stubborn market forces: many lawyers knowingly litigate 
on the cheap because they reap only a fraction of the gain from efforts to 
maximize case value (a principal–agent problem); they rarely face 
consequences for sub-optimal performance due to limited client ability to catch 
bad performance (an asymmetric-information problem); and a briefing 
crackdown may be difficult because ethics authorities have limited resources 
and such a crackdown could be viewed as decreasing access to justice or 
hindering entry for new lawyers (a regulatory cost problem). In this light, the 
legal services market is like other flawed markets, from shady investments to 
dietary supplements, where insufficiently informed buyers suffer at the hands 
of unscrupulous sellers whom regulators lack the firepower or will to police. 
Those cautionary notes aside, Part IV offers several prescriptions. Part 
IV.B proposes educational efforts and reforms: increasing support for bar 
association resource- and expertise-sharing that could drive down the cost of 
complex briefings; targeting law school experiential learning to the type of 
briefings lawyers write badly; and making employment discrimination law 
both simpler and a bar examination topic. Part IV.C proposes increasing client 
information about lawyer expertise in two ways: liberalizing the ethics rules 
that now restrict lawyer claims of expertise and broadening public access to 
litigation filings. Part IV.D proposes reforms to increase the supply of 
competent lawyers: eliminating the ban on corporations owning law practices 
and relaxing standing-to-sue restrictions on “testers” whom advocacy groups 
deploy to find discrimination. Part IV.E proposes increasing enforcement of 
“competence” ethics rules against incompetent brief-writers. The Conclusion 
summarizes and discusses possible future research based on both the findings 
and the methodology this Article adds to the literature. 
MOSS GALLEYSPROOFS3 9/26/2013 10:42 AM 
68 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:59 
I. METHODOLOGY 
A. The “Same-Actor” Defense: A Case Study in Briefing Quality 
1. The Same-Actor Defense: A Powerful Tool That Defeats Many Claims, 
but Faces Deep Intra-circuit Splits 
a. Extensive Caselaw Crediting the Defense 
“When the same person hires and later fires the employee who claims that 
his firing was discriminatory, judges are skeptical, because why would 
someone who disliked whites, or Germans, or members of some other group to 
be working for him have hired such a person in the first place?”11 
This “same-actor defense,”12 “same-actor inference,”13 or “common-actor 
presumption”14 rests on the logic Judge Richard Posner bluntly explained in 
the above quotation. Extensive caselaw in most circuits credits the defense as a 
 
 11 Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2002). Other courts’ elaborations of the 
rationale for the same-actor defense are similar: 
Lamb and . . . Phillips were the sole actors involved in Wofford’s hiring and termination. Under 
the “same-actor inference” . . . , the fact that the same person or group . . . did both the hiring and 
firing over a short time frame is strong evidence that there was no discrimination . . . . If Lamb 
and Phillips had despised Wofford because of [his] color . . . , it seems odd that they would have 
hired him . . . . 
Wofford v. Middletown Tube Works, Inc., 67 F. App’x 312, 318 (6th Cir. 2003). 
Davis was hired . . . [and] fired only four years later . . . by Kimzey, . . . giv[ing] rise to an 
inference that age discrimination was not the motive . . . . This “same actor” inference has been 
accepted . . . [because] “[c]laims that employer animus exists in termination but not in hiring 
seem irrational. . . . [I]t hardly makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes . . . , only to 
fire them once they are on the job.” 
Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996) (alteration to “claims” in original) (quoting Proud 
v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 12 E.g., Tuttle v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 474 F.3d 307, 319 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Metro argues that it is 
entitled to [judgment as a matter of law] because Tuttle cannot establish pretext due to the ‘honest belief rule,’ 
[and] the ‘same actor’ defense . . . .”). 
 13 E.g., Schechner v. KPIX-TV, 686 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]here the same actor is 
responsible for both the hiring and the firing . . . within a short period . . . , a strong inference arises that there 
was no discriminatory motive. . . . [This] is a ‘strong inference’ that a court must take into account on a 
summary judgment motion.” (alteration to “where” in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 14 E.g., Herrnreiter, 315 F.3d at 747. 
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basis for summary judgment, in appellate15 and district16 decisions alike. 
Schechner v. KPIX-TV17 is typical in reciting the key same-actor facts: 
“Longinotti and Rosenheim signed [Plaintiffs] to new contracts not long before 
they laid off [both]. In light of the same-actor inference, . . . [Plaintiffs] failed 
to present sufficient evidence . . . to survive summary judgment . . . .”18 
This caselaw shows it is no empty verbiage when judges call the inference 
“strong” and “powerful,”19 or a “significant burden” that overcomes “fealty to 
proof schemes.”20 Because same-actor facts are a “recurrent situation,”21 the 
defense, though “largely ignored in the legal academic literature[,] . . . has 
been a silent killer” of discrimination claims.22 Courts focus less on the nature 
of a “presumption” (which implies ability to rebut) than on the presumption 
being “strong,” “approach[ing] same actor [cases] with overwhelming 
skepticism toward the plaintiff[] . . . [that] is extremely difficult for a plaintiff 
to overcome as a practical matter.”23 Scholarship documents how commonly 
the presence of a “same actor” yields dismissal despite strong evidence the 
 
 15 See, e.g., Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1183–84 (10th Cir. 2006); Wofford, 67 F. 
App’x at 318–19; Herrnreiter, 315 F.3d at 747; Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 560–61 (2d Cir. 
1997); Brown, 82 F.3d at 658; Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959–61 (4th Cir. 1996); 
EEOC v. Our Lady of the Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 152 (7th Cir. 1996); Proud, 945 F.2d at 797–
98. 
 16 See, e.g., Blasi v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 00-CV-5320 (RRM)(MDG), 03-CV-3836 (RRM)(MDG), 
2012 WL 3307227, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2012) (granting summary judgment because “plaintiff has not 
established a prima facie case” where she “was hired and fired by the same decisionmakers over a short 
time”); Cheesman v. Amerititle, No. CV-07-3094-LRS, 2010 WL 2926241, at *8 (E.D. Wash. July 22, 2010); 
Martin v. State Univ. of N.Y., 704 F. Supp. 2d 202, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (crediting same-actor defense in 
granting summary judgment: “[Her] claims are also badly weakened in light of Henry’s instrumental role in 
hiring . . . . [T]he notion that Henry subsequently developed prejudice against . . . [her] national origin, less 
than two years after hiring her, is simply not credible.”); Abuzir v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., No. 04 C 5835, 2007 
WL 2003081, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 2007) (granting summary judgment because of the “strong inference of 
nondiscrimination”: “it makes little sense that Greenlee’s evaluation was based upon racial animus [because] 
she had hired him”); Keri v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., No. 1:04-CV-224-TS, 2005 WL 4715211, at *22 
(N.D. Ind. Nov. 9, 2005); Bernstein v. St. Paul Cos., 134 F. Supp. 2d 730, 740 (D. Md. 2001). 
 17 686 F.3d 1018. 
 18 Id. at 1027. 
 19 Evans, 80 F.3d at 959 (stating that “because Houseman is the same person who hired Evans, there is a 
‘powerful inference’ that the failure to promote” was not discriminatory). 
 20 Proud, 945 F.2d at 796, 798. 
 21 Id. at 796. 
 22 Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 359 (2010). 
 23 Kerri Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination Law, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 111, 128 
(2011). 
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employer gave the sort of pretextual explanation that typically lets a claim 
survive summary judgment.24 
b. Criticism of the Defense, Including in the Circuits Crediting It 
The defense has earned mostly unfavorable academic attention—yet the 
one publication initially mentioning it, in passing, somehow has trumped the 
wider criticism. The origin of the doctrine was a brief mention in a prominent 
1991 law and economics publication25 that Proud v. Stone,26 “[t]he first case to 
apply the same-actor inference to dismiss” a claim,27 turned into a “strong 
inference”: 
“[C]laims that employer animus exists in termination but not in hiring 
seem irrational.” . . . [For] the putative discriminator, “[i]t hardly 
makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes (thereby 
incurring the psychological costs of associating with them), only to 
fire them . . . .”28 
Though the defense is the rare major doctrine to trace directly to an 
academic article, almost all academic commentary since has been negative. 
With cases declaring a “strong presumption” going well beyond the original 
article’s simple logical point, scholars have argued that a “strong presumption” 
yields “erratic and unthinking” dismissals of too many claims,29 especially 
given “the structure so prevalent in today’s work environments where several 
individuals contribute to a decision.”30 Others attack the psychological 
 
 24 See Julie S. Northup, Comment, The “Same Actor Inference” in Employment Discrimination: Cheap 
Justice?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 193, 201 (1998) (noting that Proud, as an early decision crediting the defense, 
“[f]oreshadow[ed] the future breadth of the doctrine, . . . conclud[ing] that ‘employers who knowingly hire 
workers within a protected group seldom will be credible targets for charges of pretextual firing’” (quoting 
Proud, 945 F.2d at 798)); Stone, supra note 23, at 118 (blaming the inference’s “undue strength” for 
“premature and unjust” summary judgment grants). 
 25 John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991). 
 26 945 F.2d 796. 
 27 Ross B. Goldman, Note, Putting Pretext in Context: Employment Discrimination, the Same-Actor 
Inference, and the Proper Roles of Judges and Juries, 93 VA. L. REV. 1533, 1546 (2007). 
 28 Proud, 945 F.2d at 797 (quoting Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 25, at 1017). 
 29 Northup, supra note 24, at 193 (arguing that “erratic and unthinking application of the ‘same actor 
inference’ will discourage . . . valid complaints[,] . . . permit[ting] employers to discriminate”); see Anna 
Laurie Bryant & Richard A. Bales, Using the Same Actor “Inference” in Employment Discrimination Cases, 
1999 UTAH L. REV. 255, 257 (“[T]he policy justifications for the inference are relatively weak, and . . . if the 
inference is given a strong presumptive effect, it could result in the dismissal of meritorious discrimination 
claims.”). 
 30 Natasha T. Martin, Immunity for Hire: How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains Discrimination in the 
Contemporary Workplace, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1117, 1163 (2008). 
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assumption of the defense. “[E]mpirical research suggests . . . [the] model of 
behavioral consistency on which the same actor inference is based[] is deeply 
flawed, and . . . behavior is far less consistent across situations” than courts 
assume.31 Specifically, because “resistance to or unintended reliance on 
implicit stereotypes varies[,] . . . [s]mall changes in the situation[] . . . give rise 
to marked behavioral inconsistency.”32 
There are well-founded reasons . . . bias will express itself less 
readily in the hiring context than later . . . . [H]iring . . . tends to make 
equal[ity] . . . norms and goals salient. . . . There is . . . little reason to 
believe . . . [a] biased employment decision maker who has hired a 
stereotyped person will . . . evaluat[e] . . . free from . . . 
stereotypes. . . . Decision makers who hold egalitarian beliefs but are 
affected by implicit bias operate in . . . tension . . . . [C]ross-
situational consistency . . . cannot be expected . . . to support a . . . 
“strong inference,” like the same actor rule.33 
Others argue that the same-actor inference, even if justifiable, is misused: 
“same-actor facts are simply evidence . . . [but] do not . . . justify . . . summary 
judgment.”34 This procedural critique blends with the substantive critique that 
crediting the defense “reduc[es] intricacies of the modern workplace and the 
complex inquiry of discrimination to a shorthand . . . [to] avoid thinking about 
discrimination in any real sense, relying instead on an insufficient marker.”35 
A few circuits share this academic skepticism of the defense, rejecting it as 
a basis for summary judgment. The Third Circuit held that even if the same 
actor fires “soon after” hiring, he may “argue to the factfinder that it should not 
find discrimination. But this is simply evidence . . . and should not be accorded 
any presumptive value.”36 The Eleventh Circuit held the same even where the 
actor had executed multiple actions (not just hiring) in Plaintiff’s favor: 
 
 31 Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: 
Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1048 (2006). 
 32 Id. at 1050–51. 
 33 Id. at 1051–52; see Stone, supra note 23, at 114 (noting that because the defense ignores how “bias 
may form [or] evolve” over years, “without any . . . refined understanding of human behavior [or] 
interpersonal dynamics, . . . [it] inexplicably creates an assumption that a single act evinces a mindset that one 
should be presumed to have years later”). 
 34 Goldman, supra note 27, at 1537; see Stone, supra note 23, at 116 (“Simplistic narratives such as 
‘someone who hires . . . should be presumed to act without bias[’] . . . have no place . . . at the summary 
judgment stage.”). 
 35 Martin, supra note 30, at 1174. 
 36 Waldron v. SL Indus., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995). Though almost two decades old, Waldron 
remains a much-cited case; no Third Circuit decision since has criticized or limited its same-actor holding. See 
also Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 321 (3d Cir. 2000) (criticizing the defense, 
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Although . . . the same individual [was] responsible for hiring[,] . . . 
promoting[,] . . . [and] terminating him, we decline to accord to this 
“same actor” fact[] . . . a presumption [against] discrimination . . . . 
[T]his [same-actor] inference is a permissible—not a mandatory—
inference that a jury may make . . . . [T]hat “same actor” evidence . . . 
[is] evidence that a jury may consider . . . . [I]t is the province of the 
jury rather than the court . . . whether the inference . . . is strong 
enough to outweigh a plaintiff’s evidence of pretext.37 
Interestingly, though most courts credit the same-actor defense as a basis 
for summary judgment,38 some circuits—in particular, the Second and 
Seventh—feature an intra-circuit split. Second Circuit cases hold that the 
defense “strongly suggest[s] . . . discrimination was unlikely”—“especially . . . 
when the firing . . . [was] only a short time after the hiring,” because “it is 
difficult to impute . . . invidious motivation . . . inconsistent with the decision 
to hire.”39 Seventh Circuit cases hold that the defense supports “a presumption 
of nondiscrimination” sufficient for summary judgment40 even if the hiring 
was seven years41 before the firing. 
Yet other cases in those circuits reject the defense with language rivaling 
cases in circuits wholly rejecting the defense. The Seventh Circuit in Nwanna 
v. Ashcroft42 reversed a summary judgment grant because “resort[ing] to the 
‘same actor inference’ is premature . . . . [I]t ‘is just something for the trier of 
fact to consider.’”43 Also reversing summary judgment, in Johnson v. Zema 
 
explaining that “an employer who harbors a discriminatory animus may nevertheless allow one or two females 
to advance for the sake of appearances”). 
 37 Williams v. Vitro Servs. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 38 Martin, Pretext in Peril, supra note 22, at 358 (“The principle has received affirmation from most of 
the courts addressing the issue . . . . [C]ourts deem same-actor evidence relevant for consideration on summary 
judgment and significant to their rulings if plaintiffs fail to rebut it, making it particularly difficult for plaintiffs 
to prove discrimination. . . . [T]he doctrine is fully entrenched in employment discrimination jurisprudence.”). 
 39 Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir. 1997) (crediting same-actor defense in 
affirming summary judgment) (emphasis added); see Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(affirming summary judgment; declaring the same-actor defense a “highly relevant factor in adjudicating a 
motion for summary judgment”); Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 137 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing 
Grady, 130 F.3d 553) (holding that same-actor facts are a highly relevant factor). 
 40 Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Grp., 129 F.3d 391, 399 (7th Cir. 1997) (crediting same-actor defense on 
summary judgment); see Rand v. CF Indus., Inc. 42 F.3d 1139, 1147 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 41 Adreani v. First Colonial Bankshares Corp., 154 F.3d 389, 392, 398 n.5 (7th Cir. 1998) (crediting 
same-actor defense in affirming summary judgment); see also Chiaramonte, 129 F.3d at 399. 
 42 66 F. App’x 9 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 43 Id. at 15 (quoting Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
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Systems Corp.44 the court held that the defense “is unlikely to be dispositive in 
very many cases” and “is not itself evidence of nondiscrimination”: 
The psychological assumption underlying the same-actor 
inference may not hold true on the facts . . . . [A] manager might hire 
a person of a certain race expecting them not to rise to a position . . . 
[of] daily contact with the manager . . . . [or] expecting that person to 
act, or dress, or talk in a way . . . deem[ed] acceptable[,] . . . then fire 
that employee if she fails to comply with . . . stereotypes. . . . [For] 
the first African-American hired, an employer might be unaware of 
his own stereotypical views . . . . [and] subsequently discover[] he 
does not wish to work with African-Americans . . . . 
. . . [F]or these reasons . . . [the] inference is unlikely to be 
dispositive . . . . [W]e have found no case . . . [of] a plaintiff . . . 
[who] produce[d] sufficient evidence . . . on summary judgment . . . 
yet was foreclosed . . . by the same-actor inference. This is 
unsurprising given that the . . . inference is not itself evidence . . . . It 
simply provides a convenient shorthand for . . . [when] a plaintiff is 
unable to present sufficient evidence of discrimination.45 
In case Johnson left any doubt, a later Seventh Circuit decision characterized 
Johnson as having “emphatically rejected the ‘same-actor inference.’”46 
The Second Circuit in Carlton v. Mystic Transportation, Inc.,47 paralleling 
the Seventh Circuit in Johnson, credited an argument that the same-actor 
defense does not support summary judgment: “the enthusiasm with which the 
actor hired the employee years before may have waned . . . because the 
relationship . . . [is] subject to time’s ‘wrackful siege of battering days.’”48 In 
Feingold v. New York,49 paralleling the Seventh Circuit in Nwanna, the Second 
Circuit declared the defense just a permissive inference, insufficient for 
summary judgment: “we reject defendants’ argument that because Sullivan and 
Schulgasser hired Feingold, an inference [of nondiscrimination] must be 
drawn”; the “‘same actor inference’ . . . would not necessarily apply here 
 
 44 170 F.3d 734, 746 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 45 Id. at 745. 
 46 Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp., 255 F.3d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment 
but rejecting same-actor defense based on Johnson). 
 47 202 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 48 Id. at 132 (quoting William Shakespeare, Sonnet LXV, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM 
SHAKESPEARE (W.J. Craig ed., 1928)). 
 49 366 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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given . . . changes in circumstances during the course of Feingold’s 
employment.”50 
For the district court briefings this Article studies, district precedents are 
apt citations,51 and the Second and Seventh Circuits feature extensive district 
caselaw on both sides of the same-actor defense. While many decisions credit 
the defense on summary judgment,52 many not only reject it as Johnson, 
Nwanna, Carlton, and Feingold did, but use strongly critical language. 
In Santiago v. General Dynamics Electric Boat Division, for example, the 
court granted summary judgment against the pro se plaintiff but rejected the 
same-actor defense, explaining, “[T]his court will not apply the inference, 
certainly not in the context of a summary judgment motion.”53  
Similarly, in Masters v. F.W. Webb Co., the court denied summary 
judgment in relevant part, stating, “[T]he inference alone is generally not a 
sufficient basis to grant summary judgment . . . when the employee has 
proffered evidence of pretext.”54 
In Stodola v. Finley & Co., the court also denied summary judgment in 
relevant part, stating, “[Gill] both hire[d] and then fire[d] Stodola. . . . [O]n the 
cogent analysis in Johnson, the Court finds the same actor doctrine 
unpersuasive. . . . Gill’s role . . . does not persuade . . . that discrimination 
played no role . . . . Should Stodola not have met [Gill’s] expectations due 
to . . . disability, . . . his decision could [be] . . . discrimination.”55 
In Ray v. Forest River, Inc., the court denied summary judgment, 
explaining, “[T]he same-actor inference may not hold true on the facts of a 
given case and, thus, is unlikely to be dispositive in many cases. . . . Plaintiffs 
 
 50 Id. at 154–55 (emphases added). 
 51 Even in appellate briefs, a leading advocacy source explains, while appellate authority is “almost 
always preferable[,] . . . the value of nonmandatory sources,” like district court caselaw, is in “tell[ing] the 
court . . . this nonauthoritative source . . . was addressing the same issue as the issue the court is currently 
addressing.” MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 126 (3d ed. 2010). A key 
reason district precedents can persuade not only district but appellate courts is that “most judges are not 
interested in breaking new ground or making new law,” so advocates should “reassure them that the result 
[they] seek is consistent with” how district judges have interpreted that authority. Id. at 46. 
 52 See supra Part I.A.1.a. 
 53 No. 3:04-cv-2062 (JCH), 2006 WL 3231413, at *1, *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 7, 2006). 
 54 No. 03-CV-6280L, 2008 WL 4181724, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2008). 
 55 No. 2:05-CV-464-PRC, 2008 WL 835709, at *13–14 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 2008). 
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have rebutted any of the asserted inferences by the . . . evidence offered . . . 
such that the resolution of the inferences is left to the jury.”56 
Finally, in Copeland v. Rosen, the court denied summary judgment in 
relevant part, detailing at length various criticisms of the same-actor defense: 
“[S]ame actor” . . . is not a necessary inference, . . . only a plausible 
one, and decisions in this Circuit . . . warn[] that its use is not . . . a 
substitute for a fact-intensive inquiry . . . . [P]lausible explanations of 
such “hire-fire” conduct . . . may support an inference of 
discriminat[ion] . . . . [A] supervisor . . . would come to realize his or 
her animus . . . only upon actually . . . working with such persons. . . . 
[One] who previously has worked . . . with members of a protected 
class [may] develop a prejudice . . . [after] an experience outside the 
workplace . . . . [S]upervisors [may] purposefully hire members . . . 
and then fire them in the hope that the act of hiring . . . will allay any 
suspicions . . . . [A] penitent supervisor [may] . . . assuage his or her 
guilt . . . by hiring . . . , only later to . . . [be] overcome again by 
animus . . . . [T]he variety of unlawful motivations . . . . , like all 
issues of intent, are . . . difficult to bring to light . . . [before] trial.57 
The reason this subpart so deeply details the criticisms of the same-actor 
defense is to document that, despite the broad success of the defense, well-
supported counterarguments exist—and should be cited by plaintiffs facing a 
same-actor defense, especially in circuits with split authority. 
2. The Hypothesis: Given the Intra-circuit Split, Plaintiffs Have No Excuse 
for Omitting Caselaw Rejecting the Same-Actor Defense 
The same-actor defense may seem an odd focus for studying briefs: it does 
not arise in all cases, so it is not the most ubiquitous issue. But it is a powerful 
defense, fatal to many cases,58 and it engenders the heated mix of support and 
criticism noted above.59 Most importantly here, the same-actor defense makes 
for an unusually good case study of plaintiffs’ brief quality for several reasons. 
Holistic evaluation of briefing quality is difficult to undertake with the 
objectivity and replicability academic study requires. Style and strategy 
choices are subjective, but even more critically, an evaluator lacks the fact 
evidence to know what arguments were available. For example, one major 
 
 56 No. 2:07-CV-246-JTM-PRC, 2009 WL 6749583, at *22 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 14, 2009). 
 57 38 F. Supp. 2d 298, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 58 See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
 59 See supra Part I.A.1. 
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issue in employment cases is whether witnesses partial to the employer can be 
credited on summary judgment.60 When plaintiffs omit that argument, it is hard 
to know whether they erred or whether the cases did not feature the relevant 
sort of witness. “[A] judge knows nothing at all about the facts” beyond what 
is presented “through the attorneys and the[] evidence” they submit,61 and the 
same is true for academic study: it is hard to know when lawyers neglect 
available arguments. 
In contrast, searching objectively for “same actor” or “common actor” 
briefings is feasible: (1) review all defense briefs with those terms62 
(eliminating irrelevant ones not pressing the defense), (2) review the plaintiffs’ 
opposing briefs for citations to the available contrary caselaw, and (3) review 
the court decision for its outcome and any holding on the same-actor defense. 
The same-actor defense is a perfect issue to study because of the deeply 
split caselaw. Few legal fields feature persistent intra-circuit splits, 
corroborating the observation that “[e]mployment discrimination law continues 
to be an evolving and complex area for litigators,”63 one of the more “uniquely 
evolving areas of law.”64 Ethics rules require lawyers to disclose “legal 
authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly 
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel,”65 
but the intra-circuit split lets defendants off the hook: given competing 
caselaw, defendants can argue no “controlling” authority is “directly” adverse 
 
 60 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000) (“[T]he court . . . must disregard 
all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe[,] . . . . giv[ing] credence to 
the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that . . . supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted 
and unimpeached, at least to the extent . . . [it] comes from disinterested witnesses.” (emphases added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see Salitros v. Chrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 562, 569 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that under Reeves, courts “must accept all the evidence favoring [Plaintiff], but only the evidence favoring 
[Defendant] that is uncontradicted and unimpeached and that comes from disinterested witnesses” (emphases 
added)). 
 61 RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING 307 (6th ed. 2009). 
 62 For the details of the Westlaw search, see infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 63 Justin D. Cummins, Overcoming Obstacles to Prosecuting Employment Discrimination Claims in the 
Twenty-First Century, in REPRESENTING EMPLOYEES IN DISCRIMINATION CASES: LEADING LAWYERS ON 
DETERMINING A CASE’S MERIT AND DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE LITIGATION STRATEGY 23, 24 (2012), 
available at 2012 WL 3058206, at *1. 
 64 Christopher B. Cato & Eric S. Volkert, Current Developments and Strategic Considerations in 
Employment Discrimination Cases, in STRATEGIES FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES: LEADING 
LAWYERS ON ANALYZING RECENT CASES, IMPLEMENTING EFFECTIVE EMPLOYEE TRAINING PROGRAMS, AND 
LEVERAGING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 51, 54 (2011), available at 2011 WL 5629126, at *2. 
 65 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2009). 
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to its position that the defense is valid.66 Some claim lawyers must disclose 
even nonbinding contrary caselaw,67 but there is a powerful counterargument: 
a strong duty to disclose contrary-to-interest arguments conflicts with the 
lawyer’s basic duty to be “a representative of clients” who “zealously asserts 
the client’s position.”68 Thus courts do not require defendants to disclose 
contrary same-actor caselaw: in the case sample, almost no defendants cited 
cases rejecting the defense, and no judge imposed discipline for the omission. 
In sum, the premise of this study is this: when a defendant presses the 
same-actor defense in a circuit with split authority, there is no excuse for a 
plaintiff failing to rebut with caselaw rejecting and criticizing the defense. 
Saying “no excuse” is blunt but, per scholarly and judicial authorities on 
briefings, fair. 
• A lawyer cannot “ignor[e] controlling authority” cited by 
opposing counsel,69 such as the circuit caselaw crediting the 
same-actor defense. 
• A brief-writer must “[a]ttack an opposing argument . . . made by 
[his] adversary . . . . Otherwise, the court will assume that [he] 
ha[s] no defense . . . .”70 Truly, “a lawyer who ignores adverse 
authority throws away the opportunity . . . to give the court 
reasons for not following it.”71 
• Not executing “research of readily available authority” is 
malpractice,72 and the “competence” ethics rule requires 
“briefs . . . [with] citation to pertinent and significant authority 
on the issues raised.”73 
 
 66 See J. Michael Medina, Ethical Concerns in Civil Appellate Advocacy, 43 Sw. L.J. 677, 708 (1989) 
(noting that “authorities have opined that the directly adverse formulation basically reduces the disclosure 
obligation to nothing,” not covering cases from courts other than the applicable circuit); cf. Rural Water Sys. 
#1 v. City of Sioux Ctr., 967 F. Supp. 1483, 1498 n.2 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (holding that while the ethics rules 
“require only the disclosure of controlling authority, . . . [they] establish the ‘floor’ or ‘minimum’ standards 
for professional conduct, not the ‘ceiling’; basic notions of professionalism demand something higher”). 
 67 See, e.g., Robert M. Tyler, Jr., Practices and Strategies for a Successful Appeal, 16 AM J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 617, 665 (1993) (“An attorney who discovers a split of authority may face a dilemma whether to 
acknowledge [it] . . . . [Some] believe that attorneys owe the court an obligation to disclose existence of 
contrary authority, although not necessarily to cite it.”). 
 68 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 2 (2009). 
 69 Dwyer et al., supra note 6, at 426 (noting that good briefs avoid both “mischaracterizing the holding” 
and “ignoring controlling authority” of adverse caselaw). 
 70 NEUMANN, supra note 61, at 325. 
 71 Id. at 324. 
 72 Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 596 (Cal. 1975). For more detail on this point, see infra Part II.A.3. 
 73 Rowe v. Nicholson, No. 05-222, 2007 WL 1470305, at *6 (Ct. Vet. App. Apr. 26, 2007). For more 
detail on this point, see infra Part II.A.3. 
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Rebutting powerful opposing arguments may be the most pivotal, and is 
certainly not an optional, part of a good brief. When asked, “[w]hat’s the most 
important part of a brief . . . ?” Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg responded, 
“anticipate what is likely to come from the [opponent] and account for it . . . . 
You know the vulnerable points, so deal with them.”74 
Failing to find and cite available caselaw has become especially 
inexcusable with online research costs having substantially decreased.75 From 
the late 1990s to present, basic Lexis or Westlaw for a solo practitioner has 
cost as little as $100–$175 a month.76 Caselaw is also free online, if in less 
easily searchable form.77 
The hypothesis that lawyers should cite available caselaw does not go too 
far. Some minor issues are not worth the distraction; but the same-actor 
defense is fatal to enough cases78 that failure to rebut it is costly. Other issues, 
like basic Rule 56 standards, are well-known, rendering elaborate citations 
unnecessary. However, the same-actor defense arises in only some cases, and 
this study finds that whether courts credit it depends on whether plaintiffs brief 
it—indicating that judges do not know the defense so well as to render briefing 
unnecessary. 
 
 74 Bryan A. Garner, Interviews with United States Supreme Court Justices: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 13 
SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 133, 142 (2010). 
 75 Lawrence Duncan MacLachlan, Gandy Dancers on the Web: How the Internet Has Raised the Bar on 
Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility to Research and Know the Law, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 607, 608–09 
(2000) (noting that even in 2000, as online legal research tools became cheaper, lawyers had less excuse for 
neglecting research). See also infra Part II.A.3. 
 76 See Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., How a Sole Practitioner Uses the “Electronic Office” to Maintain a 
Competitive Law Practice, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 141, 144 (1998) (noting, in 1998, Lexis and Westlaw charged 
approximately $125 to “allow a solo practitioner . . . unlimited access to . . . [a] state’s database . . . . [and] 
federal materials in his or her circuit”); Josh Williams, WestlawNext and Lexis Advance, LAWYER 2.0 (Mar. 
20, 2011), www.lawyer2point0.com/research (noting, in 2011, WestlawNext costs $250, and Lexis Advance 
$175, for monthly “unlimited access to all case and statutory law from all state and federal jurisdictions[,] . . . 
briefs, pleadings, and motions, . . . [and] 24 different treatises and forms databases”). 
 77 Robert J. Ambrogi, The Internet Has Come a Long Way (But It Still Has a Long Way to Go), OR. ST. 
B. BULL. (Apr. 2012), www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/12apr/legalonline.html. 
 78 See supra notes 38–41 (collecting summary judgment grants based on the same-actor defense). 
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B. Case Sample and Data Set: Same-Actor Briefings in Selected Districts 
1. Case Sample: Selected Judicial Districts with a High Density of Cases, 
Quality Lawyers, and Legal Resources 
The case sample is as follows: all employment discrimination cases with 
fully briefed and decided summary judgment motions in which the defendant 
pressed the same-actor defense in the Southern District of New York or in any 
districts within the Seventh Circuit. These districts were chosen for several 
reasons. 
First, the Second and the Seventh Circuits feature a rich split of authority 
on the same-actor defense, with multiple appellate and district precedents on 
both sides.79 Other circuits are not so split; the Third Circuit alone has rejected 
the same-actor inference,80 and the same-actor defense has been strongly 
adopted without much contrary caselaw in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits.81 
Second, the selected jurisdictions have high case volume. The Southern 
District of New York alone had more qualifying briefings (fifty-two) than all 
districts in the Seventh Circuit (forty-nine). The Seventh Circuit has substantial 
volume in the Chicago-based Northern District of Illinois, but the study 
included the Circuit’s other districts to obtain a sample size similar to that of 
the Southern District of New York. 
Third, a study scrutinizing and ultimately criticizing plaintiffs’ lawyers 
should examine a sample likely to include relatively strong lawyering. Major 
cities like New York and Chicago not only have many top employment 
lawyers, but active chapters of leading bar associations.82 For example, the 
 
 79 See supra Part I.A.1. 
 80 Waldron v. SL Indus., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing a summary judgment grant that 
had been based in part on the same-actor defense, because, quoting the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, same-actor facts are “simply evidence like any other and should not be accorded any 
presumptive value”). 
 81 JOHN F. BUCKLEY IV & MICHAEL R. LINDSAY, DEFENSE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS § 6:15 
(2012) (noting clarity of Fourth and Eighth Circuit caselaw and contrary caselaw elsewhere). 
 82 See, e.g., Employment Lawyers, CHI. B. ASS’N, http://www.chicagobar.org/AM/Template.cfm? 
Section=Employment_Lawyers (last visited Aug. 14, 2013); Labor and Employment Law, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N, 
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Labor_and_Employment_Law_Home&Template=/Custom
Source/SectionHome.cfm&Sec=LABR (last visited Aug. 14, 2013); Law Firm Rankings 2013: The Best Law 
Firms in Each Practice Area: Labor and Employment, VAULT, http://www.vault.com/wps/portal/usa/rankings/ 
individual?rankingId1=16&rankingId2=22&rankings=1&regionId=0&rankingYear=2013 (last visited Aug. 
14, 2013) (showing that nine of the top fifteen labor and employment law firms are located in New York City 
or Chicago). 
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plaintiff-side National Employment Lawyers Association has large Illinois and 
New York chapters with listservs and continuing legal education events that 
advise lawyers and keep them current.83 If plaintiffs’ briefings are poor in even 
these jurisdictions with a high density of specialists and resources, that bodes 
poorly for the entire field. 
2. Data Set: Summary Judgment Briefs on the Same-Actor Defense 
The starting point was the set of all defendants’ summary judgment briefs 
pressing the same-actor defense in the Westlaw “District Court Filings” 
database of each selected district.84 The search yielded hundreds of filings, 
many irrelevant (pleadings, off-point motions, etc.), but the plurality were 
summary judgment briefs—the main context for same-actor argument. The 
databases include briefs dating back to 1999, but with many more following 
the 2003–2005 federal e-filing mandate.85 The data set then consisted of the 
plaintiffs’ summary judgment briefs opposing defense briefs pressing the 
same-actor defense. When a defense brief cited the defense, the plaintiff’s brief 
and ensuing decision (if any) were procured from Westlaw—or, if unavailable 
(the Westlaw database is incomplete), from PACER.86 In total, 102 briefings 
fit the criteria for inclusion in this study. 
II. FINDINGS 
This Part details the three findings of this study. First, the vast majority of 
plaintiffs’ briefs (72%) are badly deficient, lacking the caselaw and arguments 
against the same-actor defense that competent briefs feature. Disturbingly 
many fall far below the most basic professional standards, either lacking any 
legal research or amounting to a troubling mess of incoherent writing.87 
 
 83 See infra notes 198–99 and accompanying text. 
 84 District Court Filings Database, WESTLAW, http://directory.westlaw.com/default.asp?GUID=WDIR 
00000000000000000000099982819&RS=WDIR2.0&VR=2.0 (follow “NY-SDCT-FILING” hyperlink or “IL-
NDCT-FILING” hyperlink, etc.; then using the terms and connectors search function, search “(“same actor” 
“same decisionmaker” “same decision-maker” “common actor” “common decisionmaker” “common decision-
maker”) +1 (doctrine presumption inference theory defense)”). 
 85 Revised General Order 09-014: General Order on Electronic Case Filing § I(A)(1) (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 
2009), available at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/_assets/_news/PRESS/GeneralOrder102607.pdf 
(noting that the court implemented electronic case filing in 2005); Electronic Case Filing Rules & Instructions, 
U.S. DISTRICT CT. S. DISTRICT N.Y. 3 (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/ecf/ecf_rules_013013.pdf 
(noting that, with few exceptions, the district implemented electronic case filing (ECF) in December 2003). 
 86 See supra note 5. 
 87 Infra Part II.A. 
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Second, bad brief-writers overwhelmingly lose on summary judgment, at an 
88% rate, whereas only 44% of good ones lose. Whether bad briefs cause 
losses or bad brief-writers choose bad cases, this finding is a major caveat to 
prior findings that discrimination cases lose on summary judgment at high 
rates; they do, but not nearly so often when lawyers litigate competently.88 
Third, bad briefs impact judicial reasoning in those decisions expressly 
addressing the same-actor defense. When a plaintiff did rebut the defense, only 
30% of decisions accept the defense; when a plaintiff did not rebut, 86% of 
decisions accept the defense. Accordingly, bad briefs affect future cases, 
skewing the caselaw in favor of the same-actor defense.89 
A. Finding #1: Most Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs’ Briefs (73%) 
Lack Caselaw and Arguments Any Competent Brief Would Feature 
Even in the Second and Seventh Circuits, where caselaw exists rejecting 
the same-actor defense,90 over twice as many plaintiffs’ briefs do not cite that 
caselaw (73%) as do (27%). Below, the left column of Table 1 shows the 
frequency of plaintiffs citing same-actor caselaw; the center and right columns 
detail the differences in win-loss rates that subpart B discusses next.  
 
TABLE 1: 




Summary Judgment Motion Outcome 
No 
     74/102 → 
 (73%) 
 P Survives Summary Judgment→ 10/74 (14%) 
 P Loses on Summary Judgment→ 59/74 (80%) 
 Settled Post-Briefs, Pre-Decision→ 5/74 (7%) 
Yes 
      28/102 → 
 (27%)  
 P Survives Summary Judgment→ 15/28 (54%) 
 P Loses on Summary Judgment→ 12/28 (43%) 
 Settled Post-Briefs, Pre-Decision→ 1/28 (4%) 
Worse, many briefs fail the most basic professional standards. 
 
 88 Infra Part II.B. 
 89 Infra Part II.C. 
 90 See supra notes 38–41. 
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1. Incoherent or Ungrammatical Writing 
Some briefs are so incoherent or ungrammatical it is hard to believe the 
author is even a college graduate. Most likely, the lawyer dictated the contents, 
then never reviewed what was typed. Writing quality exists along a spectrum, 
so no objective “count” exists of how many briefs contained bad writing, but 
the following are five of the worst. Each block quote is an excerpt from one 
brief; the omissions replaced with ellipses did not cause the grammar or clarity 
problems.91 
In this first example, all four of the following ungrammatical sentences are 
in just the brief’s short “Preliminary Statement,” which also fails to say what 
kind of discrimination (race, sex, etc.) Plaintiffs claimed: 
The Defendants seeks dismissal of the above mentioned Causes of 
Action . . . . The Plaintiffs will demonstrate that they suffered an 
adverse employment [“action” is missing], and that there is an 
inference of discrimination and/or a discriminatory intent . . . . The 
Plaintiffs will set forth sufficient facts detailing the Defendant 
enactment and/or enforcement of a policy designed to permit 
unlawful discrimination . . . . Upon presenting such evidence a trial is 
required, and not, dismissal as sought by the Defendants.92 
In this second example, the fragmentary first sentence was a full sentence 
in the brief, and the second sentence runs on confusingly: 
Defendants’ suggestion that because Allegra is also Caucasion [sic] is 
a red herring. . . . Plaintiff had every reason to believe that her 
employment would continue, as she relied on the course of actions 
that occurred the year prior, when she was kept on, as she had been 
hired as a full time employee, as others had not.93 
The following two ungrammatical sentences are in a brief consisting 
entirely of numbered paragraphs—the proper form for affidavits, not briefs: 
 
 91 For briefs criticized as ungrammatical, the actual PDFs—not just the text in the Westlaw database—
were reviewed to make sure the errors did not trace to scanning inaccuracy. Some of the more egregious errors 
have been highlighted with a “[sic].” 
 92 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion and in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 
for Summary Judgment at 1–2, Estate of Hamilton v. City of New York, No. 06CV15405(DC) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
13, 2009). 
 93 Plaintiff Robin Rinsler’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Sony Pictures Entm’t, 
Inc. and Entrada Prods., Inc. Motion for Summary Judgment, Rinsler v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., No. 02 CV 
4096 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2003). Both quoted sentences appear as they do in the brief; neither was 
truncated by the ellipses. 
MOSS GALLEYSPROOFS3 9/26/2013 10:42 AM 
2013] BAD BRIEFS, BAD LAW, BAD MARKETS 83 
22. It is true that when the same person who initially hired a Plaintiff 
is the same person who also carried out the termination, that this does 
“strongly suggest that invidious discrimination was unlikely.” And 
that “it is difficult to impute to her an invidious motivation that would 
be inconsistent with the decision to hire.”94 
The argument section of the following quoted brief began with this 
essentially incoherent and ungrammatical header: “STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 . . . (1973) Is Controlling Herein and Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133 (2000).”95 The section then proceeds to 
make a series of awkwardly choppy assertions with no fact citations for any of 
them:  
Plaintiff was the recipient of gender and ethnic remarks. Plaintiff was 
constantly threatened. Plaintiff’s private and confidential information 
was divulged to the team (medical information) contrary to HIPPA 
and other applicable laws and regulations; An atmosphere against 
Hispanics permeated the work force; Plaintiff was demeaned and 
humiliated in a team meeting and on other occasions; Plaintiff was 
threatened to wit: “This is a very unfortunate situation for you to be 
in. Now all eyes will be on you watching every step you make. You 
might be 20% of the team but 80% of its problems. This is about you, 
not the team”. Plaintiff was continuously harassed;.[sic] Plaintiff was 
unreasonably transferred and then demoted; Plaintiff was assigned to 
undesirable working conditions to wit: Cramped, dusty and 
unsanitary storage room with no windows or ventilation. There was a 
ventilation conduct at the ceiling right above his desk that emanated 
toxic gasses.96 
This final example is an excerpt from a brief fraught with grammatical 
errors in each of several consecutive sentences: 
Moreover, it is questionable whether or not defendant Amy Etheride 
[sic] is the person, who in fact hired plaintiff. . . . Amy Etheridge was 
among the four people, who interviewed plaintiff . . . . Therefore, 
defendant Amy Etheridge was merely a member of the committee, 
 
 94 Plaintiff Bryant Torres’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 7, Torres v. Affinity Health Plan, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 10244 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2010) (citation 
omitted). 
 95 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, De 
La Cruz v. City of New York, 783 F. Supp. 2d 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 09 Civ. 4905(FM)). 
 96 Id. at 5. 
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who hired her but she is not clear as to her authority to hire plaintiff 
on her own.97 
2. Agreeing That Same-Actor “Strongly” Implies Nondiscrimination 
Three plaintiffs’ briefs not only fail to dispute the defense, but affirmatively 
concede that same-actor facts in their cases strongly imply nondiscrimination. 
• It is true that when the same person who initially hired a 
Plaintiff is the same person who also carried out the 
termination, that this does “strongly suggest that invidious 
discrimination was unlikely.” Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 
83, 91 (2nd Cir. 2000). And that “it is difficult to impute to her 
an invidious motivation that would be inconsistent with the 
decision to hire.” Id. See also Grady v. Affiliated Central, Inc., 
130 F.3d 553 (2nd Cir. 1997). However, this factor is only one 
factor to consider, and is not dispositive of the issue of 
potential discrimination.98 [The preceding is the brief’s entire 
discussion of the same-actor caselaw.] 
• Grady does not present an unrebuttable presumption, but only 
a strong inference, against discriminatory intent. Plaintiff 
respectfully submits that, in light of the circumstances 
surrounding plaintiff’s termination, she has overcome this 
strong inference.99 
• [Defendant] argu[es] that the “same actor” doctrine 
applies. . . . “[W]hen the person who made the decision to fire 
was the same person who made the decision to hire, it is 
difficult to impute . . . an invidious motivation that would be 
inconsistent with the decision to hire.” See Grady . . . . [T]he 
inference is permissive, not mandatory, thus the Court would 
not be compelled to give SunGard the benefit of the 
doubt . . . .100 
 
 97 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law & Affirmation in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 16, Chestnut v. Esquire Deposition Servs. LLC, No. 08-CV-4030 (LAK)(MHD) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
13, 2009).  
 98 Plaintiff Bryant Torres’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, supra note 94, at 7. 
 99 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 5–6, 
Lenhoff v. Getty, No. 97 Civ. 9458 (LMM) (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1999).  
 100 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 13–14, Gioia v. 
Sungard Data Sys., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 8342 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2010) (second ellipsis in original). 
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3. No Legal Research—Just Boilerplate Lists of Unhelpful, Basic Cases 
Many briefs offer no caselaw beyond boilerplate citations to a few decades-
old basic decisions, citations so perfunctory that they establish nothing useful. 
One brief consisted of thirty-four numbered paragraphs—the format of 
complaints101 and fact evidence submissions,102 not briefs—and cited only six 
cases: 
• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,103 the 1973 Supreme 
Court case listing each side’s basic evidentiary burdens in a 
Title VII case; 
• Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.104 and Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett,105 two of the three major 1986 precedents on modern 
Rule 56 standards;106 and 
• three circuit precedents cited only for basic Title VII law.107 
A similar brief had an unusually short “Argument” section (barely seven-and-
a-half pages), of which four pages were boilerplate basic law, such as the 
following beginnings of several paragraphs taking up much of those four 
pages: 
A court may grant summary judgment only if . . . . 
If the summary judgment movant satisfies its initial burden of 
production, the burden of proof shifts to the nonmovant . . . . 
A genuine factual issue exists if there is sufficient evidence 
favoring the nonmovant . . . . 
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must 
construe the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party . . . . 
. . . . 
 
 101 E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b) (“PARAGRAPHS; SEPARATE STATEMENTS. A party must state its claims or 
defenses in numbered paragraphs . . . .”). 
 102 E.g., S.D.N.Y. R. 56.1 (requiring on summary judgment that each party file not only a brief, but an 
evidentiarily supported “statement, in numbered paragraphs, of the material facts as to which the moving party 
contends there is no genuine issue to be tried”). 
 103 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 104 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
 105 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 106 The third, also part of the boilerplate summary judgment standard sections of many of the briefs, is 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 107 Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 4–6, O’Shields v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins., Co., No. 02 C 9218, (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2004).  
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To establish a prima facie case of discrimination . . . . 
In a series of decisions, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 
U.S. 792 (1973), Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdines, 450 
U.S. 248(1981) [sic] and St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 
502 (1993), . . . set forth the allocation of burdens and orders of 
presentation in Title VII cases . . . .108 
Many other briefs had only boilerplate caselaw stating unhelpfully basic 
points, typically at the start of the summary judgment standard or argument 
sections: 
• one brief cited only three cases on the discrimination claim—
one Rule 56 precedent from 1986 and two basic discrimination 
precedents;109 
• one cited six basic cases—three on Title VII, three on Rule 56 
(with overlap between the Title VII and Rule 56 citations);110 
• one cited eight cases—five on Rule 56 standards in a 
boilerplate first paragraph, then just three cases defendant 
cited as supporting summary judgment (without any 
competing caselaw);111 
• one cited nine cases—six in the “Summary Judgment 
Standard” section, and then—in an “Argument” section of just 
497 words—three cases on basic discrimination and retaliation 
standards;112 and 
• one cited ten cases—all just for general principles of Rule 56 
(six cases) and Title VII (four)—and all ten in the six 
boilerplate paragraphs that start the summary judgment 
standard and argument sections.113 
 
 108 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 5–8, 
Siddiqi v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07 CV 2740(CM)(RLE)). 
 109 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 2–3, 7, Parker v. 
City of Elgin, No. 03 C 0171 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2004) (offering three similarly unhelpful cases on Plaintiff’s 
unrelated Due Process claim). 
 110 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 5–
6, 9, 12–13, Augsburger v. Firststar Bank, No. 03 C 50019 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2004). 
 111 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 5–6, 
10, Aguilera v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 234 F. Supp. 2d 840 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (No. 01 C 5913). 
 112 Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 19–23, Whalen v. Vuteq USA, 
Inc., No. 08-cv-00009-RLY-WGH (S.D. Ind. May 13, 2009) (excluding headings and citations in word count). 
 113 Memorandum in Support of Response to Motion for Summary Judgment at 9–10, Tinnin-Bey v. 
Marion Cnty. Juvenile Court Justice Complex, No. 07-cv-1248-SEB-TAB (S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2009). 
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Others cited more cases, but in reusable boilerplate reciting basic Rule 56 and 
Title VII standards not tailored to the particular case.114 
The above ten briefs are only some of the clearest examples of doing no 
research tailored to the case. Other briefs are similar, featuring only one or 
very few on-point citations. Such briefs not only fail to support their arguments 
with authority, but risk citing long-abrogated law, as noted below. 
4. Relying on Long-Abrogated Caselaw Declaring Summary Judgment 
“Ordinarily Inappropriate” in Employment Discrimination Cases 
Some lawyers claim unawareness that courts regularly grant summary 
judgment in employment cases. The below excerpts are from five briefs that 
cite long-abrogated cases from the 1970s to early 1990s deeming summary 
judgment improper in such cases. 
• STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES  
This well established law that summary judgment in 
employment discrimination cases is especially questionable 
because as a general rule, summary judgment is not a proper 
vehicle for resolving claims of employment discrimination 
which often turn on an employer’s motivation and intent. 
Disputes as to the employer’s motives, intent or state of mind 
raise factual issues, precluding summary judgment. In the 
absence of direct evidence of discrimination, motivation and 
intent must often be proven through the use of circumstantial 
evidence which may necessitate the resolution of conflicting 
inferences, a task peculiarly within the province of the jury. 
Delgado v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 815 F2d 641, 644 (11th 
Cir. 1987)(emphasis added); see also, Clemons v. Dougherty 
Co., 684 F2d 1365 (11th Cir. 1982).  
See also Hayden v. First Nat. Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 595 
F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir.1979). (“When dealing with 
employment discrimination cases, . . . granting of summary 
judgment is especially questionable.”)115 
 
 114 E.g., Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 
2–3, 14–15, 17–19, Vargas v. Midtown Air Condition & Ventilation, Ltd., No. 07-03343 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 
2008); Plaintiff Robin Rinsler’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 93. 
 115 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 11–12, 
Turowski v. Triarc Cos., 761 F. Supp. 2d 107 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 09 Civ. 03979(VM)) (omission in 
original). 
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• When deciding whether this drastic provisional remedy should 
be granted in a discrimination case, additional considerations 
should be taken into account. A trial court must be cautious 
about granting summary judgment to an employer when, as 
here, its intent is at issue. See Montana v. First Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n, 869 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir.1989); Meiri v. Dacon, 
759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S. 
Ct. 88 L Ed. 2d 74 (1085)[sic], Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 
153, 159 (2d Cir. 1984).116 
• [T]his is a drastic remedy that precludes a trial . . . . Because 
this is a discrimination case where intent and state of mind are 
in dispute, summary judgment is ordinarily 
inappropriate . . . .117 
• In employment discrimination cases, courts are particularly 
cautious about granting summary judgment where intent is at 
issue.118 
This presumption against summary judgment in discrimination is not good 
law now, and it has not been for decades. The Supreme Court’s 1986 “trilogy” 
of decisions expanding summary judgment119 “completely changed the 
landscape in employment discrimination summary judgment proceedings”120: 
Before the summary judgment trilogy, courts had been reluctant to 
grant summary judgment . . . in a civil rights case . . . . In response to 
the trilogy, lower courts have granted summary judgment . . . where 
there exist questions of fact concerning . . . motive, thereby denying 
to employment discrimination plaintiffs their “day in court.”121 
 
 116 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, 
Liburd v. Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., No. 07-CV-11316 (H.B.) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2009). 
 117 Plaintiff Bryant Torres’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment, supra note 94, at 2. 
 118 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra 
note 108, at 7. 
 119 See supra notes 104–06. 
 120 Christopher J. Emden, Note, Subverting Rule 56? McDonnell Douglas, White v. Baxter Healthcare 
Corp., and the Mess of Summary Judgment in Mixed-Motive Cases, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 139, 151 
(2010). 
 121 Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary 
Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 206–07 (1993) (footnote omitted); see Benjamin 
D. McAninch, Commentary, Removing the Thumb from the Scale: The Eleventh Circuit Summary Judgment 
Standard for Disparate Treatment Cases in the Wake of Chapman v. A1 Transport, 53 ALA. L. REV. 949, 950 
(2002) (“Because of the intent requirement in employment discrimination . . . [courts were] reluctant to grant 
motions for summary judgment in these cases. The Supreme Court moved away from this sparing use . . . with 
its 1986 trilogy.” (footnote omitted)). 
MOSS GALLEYSPROOFS3 9/26/2013 10:42 AM 
2013] BAD BRIEFS, BAD LAW, BAD MARKETS 89 
Judge Posner even has admitted the view that “docket pressures” require 
summary judgment dismissals whenever employment discrimination cases are 
“marginal,” even if “a rational fact finder could return a verdict for the 
nonmov[ant]”122—a sentiment surprising to hear a judge admit, but 
unsurprising for a judge to hold, given the high rate of summary judgment 
grants.123 Briefs such as the above, still citing obviously out-of-date caselaw 
declaring summary judgment “especially questionable” in discrimination 
cases,124 hint that their authors copied caselaw from old and long-outdated 
briefs, never noticing the obvious, decades-long trend in favor of granting 
summary judgment in most such cases. 
5. Defaulting by Failing to Oppose Summary Judgment At All 
A few plaintiffs’ lawyers fully defaulted, filing nothing opposing the 
defense summary judgment motion. Having never filed anything seeking to 
dismiss the case voluntarily125 or to withdraw as plaintiff’s counsel,126 one 
plaintiff’s lawyer defaulted without explanation.127 Another plaintiff’s lawyer 
defaulted repeatedly after a series of extensions he sought and won with a 
variety of excuses: first, he sought and received a three-week extension; next, 
he sought and received another one-week extension, citing alleged computer 
problems related to an office move; then, he defaulted, filing nothing for 
almost three months after the twice-extended deadline.128 Whatever their 
 
 122 Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 403 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The growing difficulty that district judges 
face in scheduling civil trials, a difficulty that is due to docket pressures . . . , makes appellate courts reluctant 
to reverse a grant of summary judgment merely because a rational factfinder could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party, if such a verdict is highly unlikely as a practical matter because the plaintiff’s case . . . is 
marginal.”). 
 123 See supra note 4. 
 124 See supra note 115. 
 125 Plaintiffs can dismiss a claim or entire case voluntarily, either unilaterally before any defendant 
answers, with the consent of all parties, or with leave of court. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a). 
 126 District courts typically require that an “attorney of record for a party may be relieved or displaced 
only by order of the Court and may not withdraw . . . without leave of the Court granted by order . . . upon a 
showing by affidavit or otherwise of satisfactory reasons.” S.D.N.Y. R. 1.4.; accord N.D. ILL. LOC. R. 83.17. 
 127 Robinson v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 08 Civ. 10293 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010), ECF No. 30 
(granting summary judgment) ( “Plaintiff has not responded to the motion although the time within which to 
do so has expired[,] . . . . [the] assertions of defendants . . . are deemed admitted. There are, in consequence, no 
genuine issues as to any material fact.”). 
 128  Second Motion to Extend Time to File Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, Thompson v. 
Am. Family Ins., No. 1:06-CV-4059 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2008). 
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reasons, these lawyers are unequivocally disregarding multiple ethical rules on 
serving clients competently and diligently.129 
B. Finding #2: Bad Brief-Writers Lose on Summary Judgment Over Twice as 
Often (86%) as Good Brief-Writers (42%) 
Excluding the six post-briefing settlements yielding no court decision, 
Table 1 shows bad brief-writers lost on summary judgment in 86% of cases 
(fifty-nine of sixty-nine), while good brief-writers lost in only 42% of cases 
(eleven of twenty-six)—a statistically significant difference.130 While a good 
brief does not ensure success, it at least buys a spin of what legendary U.S. 
District Judge Charles Brieant called the “fair roulette wheel” that, win or lose, 
leaves even the losers feeling they got a fair shake.131 In contrast, bad brief-
writers are essentially doomed to lose, their clients never enjoying the trial that 
is so critical to a sense that, regardless of the result, they had their fair day in 
court. High rates of summary judgment grants draw criticism for “denying to 
employment discrimination plaintiffs their ‘day in court.’”132 Critics argue that 
“a legal representative’s motions and questions are no substitutes for the 
victim’s own day in court,”133 especially on the theory that litigation must 
serve goals of not only accuracy, but also “procedural justice” under “the old 
and powerful idea that a process that guarantees rights of meaningful 
participation is an essential prerequisite for the legitimate authority of action-
guiding legal norms.”134 
The finding that summary judgment loss rates vary substantially with brief 
quality is a major caveat to (a) studies showing employment discrimination 
plaintiffs lose on summary judgment at high rates135 and (b) scholarship 
 
 129 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009) (“A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”); Id. R.1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable 
diligence . . . in representing a client.”); Id. R. 8.4 (“It is professional misconduct . . . [to] engage in conduct 
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . .”). 
 130 The difference in loss rate between good and bad briefs is significant at the p < 0.0001 level—the 
probability is less than one in ten thousand that the difference in loss rate is random. 
 131 The judge gave this oral warning—“I run a fair roulette wheel”—at the start of the author’s first trial 
for a discrimination plaintiff; the jury found for the defendant, making the quote memorable. 
 132 McGinley, supra note 121, at 207. 
 133 Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-
Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 702 (2010). 
 134 Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183 (2004). 
 135 See Berger et al., supra note 4, at 54–60 (discussing results of a study examining the rate at which 
summary judgment is granted in employment discrimination cases); Miller, supra note 4, at 1052–53 (noting 
that courts increasingly grant summary judgment in many types of cases, including age discrimination cases); 
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interpreting courts’ increased dismissal of such cases as broad-based “hostility 
to litigation as a tool of dispute resolution.”136 Broadly, this study comports 
with both of those scholarship lines: (a) pooling good and bad briefs together, 
only 22% of cases survived summary judgment—a somewhat lower success 
rate than in prior studies, which makes sense because the sample is somewhat 
defense skewed, consisting of cases in which defendants knew to cite, and had 
evidence supporting, the same-actor defense; and (b) courts unquestionably 
have increased use of both summary judgment and prediscovery dismissal 
motions to terminate cases before trial.137 Yet the caveat this Article adds is 
significant: courts do not indiscriminately dismiss regardless of plaintiffs’ 
efforts to show case merit; where plaintiffs do a good job of briefing their 
cases, courts more often than not deny defendants summary judgment. In short, 
the quality of the plaintiff’s brief is an important, but previously unexamined, 
variable in the basic loss rates documented in previous studies. 
This finding that bad briefs are far more likely to lose is not, however, 
necessarily a finding of causation. The cause of the loss could be poor case 
merits, not just poor brief quality, because bad brief-writers, unaware they 
should have rebutted a key defense, likely are bad at case selection as well. 
Their weak command of the discrimination caselaw can lead them to litigate 
cases rejected by more knowledgeable lawyers who spotted weaknesses in 
those cases.138 Because case merit is not objectively discernible or quantifiable 
 
Selmi, supra note 4, at 558–60 (noting that plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases “generally fare 
worse than most other kinds of civil plaintiffs” and that “nearly ninety-eight percent of [employment 
discrimination cases decided by pretrial motions] were decided in favor of defendants”); Cecil & Cort, supra 
note 4, at 2–4, 9–10 (indicating that in 2006 summary judgment was granted about 60% of the time in civil 
cases as a whole and over 70% of the time in employment discrimination cases). 
 136 Scott A. Moss, Fighting Discrimination While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two Supreme Courts, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 982, 1002–03 (2007) (citing and applying to employment litigation the theories of 
Andrew Siegel); see Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing 
Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1108 (2006) (theorizing that the Court’s 
“hostility to litigation” is the “all-encompassing theme of the Rehnquist era” and explains many of the Court’s 
decisions). 
 137 See Miller, supra note 4, at 1048–56 (noting increased summary judgment rates, starting with, and 
since, the 1986 trilogy of summary judgment precedents); Moss, supra note 136, at 987–93 (noting that 
judicially created doctrines from the late 1990s to the late 2000s increased grounds for dismissing 
discrimination cases); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1014 (studying all Rule 12 dismissal motions 
in Title VII cases the year before and year after Twombly, and finding after Twombly “a higher percentage of 
decisions that granted a motion to dismiss”). 
 138 A substantial number of prospective clients have no claim because “an overwhelming majority” of at-
will employees incorrectly believe they can be fired only for “just cause” or “good cause,” leading many fired 
employees to the incorrect belief that they can sue to prove their firings were simply unjust. See, e.g., Pauline 
T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-
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to an outside observer, the above finding of a statistical disparity cannot 
control for case merit. 
Despite this causation ambiguity, the striking finding remains: lawyers who 
file bad briefs are all but doomed to lose, showing that loss rates are not 
independent of briefing or case quality. Further, as detailed in the next subpart, 
even if bad briefs are not provably the sole cause of plaintiffs’ losses, there is 
strong evidence that bad briefs impact the caselaw: When a plaintiff loses on 
summary judgment, the judicial decision is much more likely to credit the 
same-actor defense after a bad plaintiff’s brief than after a good one. 
C. Finding #3: Bad Briefs Yield More Pro-defense Caselaw 
Do bad writers lose on summary judgment because they write bad briefs or 
because, lacking legal acumen, they take bad cases that savvier lawyers reject? 
The causation of bad writers’ high loss rate is hard to pinpoint because bad 
briefings and bad case selection trace to the same lack of knowledge. However, 
the data do disclose another, clearer causal relationship. 
Of the thirty-one summary judgment decisions in the sample expressly 
addressing the same-actor defense, when a plaintiff rebutted the defense with a 
quality brief, the decision is far more likely to reject the defense—even 
controlling for whether the court granted or denied summary judgment, as 
summarized by Table 2 below. 
TABLE 2: 
WHETHER A DECISION CREDITS A SAME-ACTOR (SA) DEFENSE 




 Total #Decisions: 15  Total #Decisions: 12 
  #Crediting SA Defense:  0 (0%)   #Crediting SA Defense: 3 (25%) 




 Total #Decisions: 10  Total #Decisions: 59 
  #Crediting SA Defense:  0 (0%)   #Crediting SA Defense: 18 (31%) 
  #Rejecting SA Defense: 2 (13%)   #Rejecting SA Defense:   1 (2%) 
 
Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 110–11 (1997) (reporting a survey finding that although the law “clearly 
permits an employer to terminate an at-will employee out of personal dislike . . . an overwhelming majority . . . 
89% . . . erroneously believe that the law forbids such a discharge). 
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Thus a summary judgment denial far more likely rejects the same-actor 
defense if the plaintiff’s brief was good: among denials, a decision expressly 
rejecting the same-actor defense follows 47% of good briefs but only 13% of 
bad briefs. Conversely, summary judgment grants expressly credit the same-
actor defense in 25% of well-briefed, but 31% of poorly-briefed, cases. The 
differences are not statistically significant: with three of the four cells in 
Table 2 containing only ten to fifteen data points, the sample sizes are small, 
and there are major selection biases as well, such as the likely conservative 
skew of the pool of judges who grant summary judgment even after a talented 
plaintiff’s lawyer took the case and filed a strong brief. But the pattern Table 2 
shows is not only internally consistent, but also consistent with this Article’s 
other findings that briefing quality matters: whether a decision credits the 
defense depends on the plaintiff’s briefing of the issue. 
In short, good plaintiffs’ briefs generate more pro-plaintiff caselaw than 
bad briefs, even controlling for win rate. This does not mean the same-actor 
caselaw is necessarily wrong, but it means bad plaintiffs’ briefs skew the 
adversarial process in which arguments for and against doctrines compete in a 
marketplace of ideas. Therefore, even if a bad plaintiff’s brief may not cause 
that plaintiff’s loss, it tends to cause future plaintiffs’ losses by skewing the 
caselaw in favor of the defense. This finding is consistent with Nancy 
Gertner’s critique of how, because “judges are encouraged to write detailed 
decisions when granting summary judgment and not to write when denying 
it . . . . decision after decision details why the plaintiff loses . . . . serv[ing] to 
justify prodefendant outcomes and thereby exacerbate the one-sided 
development of the law.”139 This Article, like Gertner’s in a different way, is 
an “account of employment discrimination law’s skewed evolution”140: the 
caselaw is path-dependent, skewing in favor of defendants because (a) a pro-
defense skew in the precedent yields more pro-defense caselaw (Gertner’s 
analysis),141 and (b) a pro-defense skew in the briefings similarly can yield 
more pro-defense caselaw (this Article’s analysis). 
It is counterintuitive that brief quality affects judges’ rationales, not just 
rulings. It makes sense that a ruling depends on whether a brief effectively 
proves case merit; but if judges know the law, then plaintiffs’ citations 
theoretically should not impact their rationales. But this argument goes too far 
 
 139 Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 110 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/ 
images/pdfs/1111.pdf. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 115. 
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in deeming briefs wholly irrelevant. The same-actor defense, though a 
“recurrent situation,”142 arises much less often than more basic discrimination 
issues. For example, in districts in the Second and Seventh Circuits from 2001 
to 2010, 127 decisions mentioned the same-actor defense, but far more 
mentioned “constructive discharge” (1,049) or “hostile work environment” 
(3,400). Given the volume and subject breadth of modern litigation, judges are 
generalists who “know a great deal about rules of procedure (which they use 
constantly), [but] usually know much less about individual rules of substantive 
law.”143 Thus, “[u]nless a case turns on . . . law about which a judge has 
thought deeply lately, the judge depends on the attorneys to explain what the 
law is and how it governs the case,”144 explaining how even judges well-versed 
in summary judgment and discrimination fundamentals may depend on 
lawyers’ briefs for a specific issue like the same-actor defense. 
III.  QUESTIONS POSED BY THE FINDINGS—AND POSSIBLE ANSWERS 
Three riddles arise from the finding that most employment discrimination 
plaintiffs’ lawyers are incompetent, lose, and produce disproportionately 
pro-defense caselaw. First, failure by clients—how can those needing lawyers 
consistently choose bad ones, given the existence of competent lawyers who 
show superior ability and results? Second, failure by lawyers—how can 
lawyers take cases they are destined to litigate badly, and lose, without being 
driven from the market? Third, failure by ethics authorities—how can judges 
and the bar, empowered to police irresponsible lawyering, tolerate this 
incompetence, especially in a field that is a substantial portion of federal 
litigation145 and that “vindicat[es] a policy that Congress considered of the 
highest priority[,] . . . . advanc[ing] the public interest” against 
discrimination?146 Subparts A–C discuss each riddle and suggest answers, 
focusing on the broad range of market failures that must exist for the majority 
of actors in a major market to be fatally subpar. 
 
 142 Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 796 (4th Cir. 1991).  
 143 NEUMANN, supra note 61, at 307. 
 144 Id. 
 145 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 3, at 103–04 (explaining that employment discrimination cases 
used to be the largest category of federal cases and has remained among the top three categories). 
 146 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). 
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A. Bad Client Choices: Why Do Most Clients Hire Lawyers Who File Bad 
Briefs and Overwhelmingly Lose with Little Hope of Reaching Trial? 
The riddle of persistently poor client choices is perhaps the least 
perplexing; the answer is that this Article’s findings show legal services, at 
least in employment litigation, to be a market featuring extremely poor buyer 
(client) information. A market can contain mostly bad apples given two 
conditions. 
First, bad buyer choices are most common where buyers typically are not 
repeat players able to learn from a bad first choice or two. Repeat play allows 
learning, but nonrepeated decisions can be persistently erroneous: a weekly 
restaurant-goer never returns after a terrible meal, but someone who chooses a 
too-risky retirement fund never gets to reinvest decades of lost savings. 
Second, bad buyer choices are most common where assessing service 
quality requires specialized knowledge. Researching lawyer filings is not a 
feasible option: it requires an ability to research court records that most clients 
lack;147 and not citing caselaw is a failing discernible to far from all clients.148 
Neither is researching win-loss records feasible: case outcomes are generally 
unavailable to find, because far more cases end in confidential settlements than 
in verdicts;149 and win-loss records in the few cases reaching verdicts are 
uninformative because the best lawyers may litigate riskier cases, win large 
settlements, etc. The difficulty of spotting bad lawyering is corroborated by 
evidence that clients cannot spot incompetence even after a lawsuit: contrast 
this Article’s finding that the vast majority of plaintiffs’ lawyers file bad (and 
doomed) briefs with the finding that only one-quarter of employment 
discrimination plaintiffs think their lawyers made “serious mistakes” or 
demonstrated “other forms of incompetence.”150 
B. Bad Lawyer Choices: How Can So Many Lawyers Litigate Cases They 
Cannot Handle Competently Without Being Driven from the Market? 
Even if clients hiring bad lawyers is understandable, the question remains: 
bad brief-writers lose, so why do lawyers compensated mainly by contingency 
 
 147 See infra Part IV.C.2 (detailing the infeasibility of researching lawyers with court dockets). 
 148 See infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing how some but not all clients can assess brief quality). 
 149 See Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 867, 869 (2007) (noting the prevalence of confidential settlement). 
 150 See Berrey et al., supra note 7, at 21. 
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fees151 take these cases? Even if clients are not well-informed about what it 
takes to win, surely lawyers are better informed. How can a market consist 
mostly of service providers not competent enough to earn money providing the 
service? There are two possible answers: ignorant optimism and profitable 
laziness. 
1. Ignorant Optimism: Employment Law as a Siren Song to the Unqualified 
The first explanation for lawyers taking cases they are destined to litigate 
badly, and lose, is ignorant optimism: bad brief-writers may not stay long in 
employment law, but they are so numerous that if each tries the field for just a 
few years, there would be more bad than good brief-writers at any time. People 
suffer cognitive biases, including overoptimism—and lawyers, “overconfident 
in their [case] predictions” in experimental findings, are no exception.152 
Employment law “is complex for those who do not regularly practice in 
this field,”153 making it “a relatively specialized field, between the complicated 
proof structures and the complex theoretical foundation.”154 Many lawyers 
litigating discrimination cases are “novices” to the field—“tort, criminal or 
family lawyers who take a federal fee-shifting case as an outgrowth of their 
regular practices.”155 Such lawyers may be ignorant of key pitfalls and legal 
issues in the field.156 Federal district judge and former NAACP lawyer 
 
 151 See infra note 158 (noting how contingency fees predominate plaintiffs’ lawyering). 
 152 Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 133 (2010). Even judges, specially tasked to assess relevance, are only mildly 
less susceptible to bias. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 778 
(2001) (reporting an experiment that found judges suffered all biases—to a lesser degree on two (framing and 
representativeness), but the same degree on three (anchoring, hindsight, egocentrism)); Andrew J. Wistrich et 
al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1251, 1251 (2005) (reporting an experiment that found judges avoid influence from only some, not most, 
inadmissible information). 
 153 Adele L. Abrams & Justin M. Winter, Lawyers Can Be Employers, Too, 45 MD. B.J. May/June 2012, 
at 22, 27; see also Galit Kiercut, Recent Developments in Employment Law and the Impact of Technology on 
Workplace Trends, in COMPLYING WITH EMPLOYMENT REGULATIONS: LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING 
LEGISLATION AND ADAPTING TO THE CHANGING STATE OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 159, 179 (2011), available at 
2011 WL 4452119, at *14 (“Employment law is a complex field where the laws change rapidly.”). 
 154 Marcia L. McCormick, Federal Regulation and the Problem of Adjudication, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 39, 
65–66 (2011); see also Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in 
Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 880 (2012) (“Employment discrimination is an area . . . with an 
unusual abundance of distinct statutes . . . . Congress frequently overrides the Court[] . . . . Courts in turn 
demonstrate unusually high levels of disagreement about the meaning of civil rights overrides.”). 
 155 Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Thomas A. Eaton, The Contours of a New FRCP, Rule 68.1: A Proposed Two-
Way Offer of Settlement Provision for Federal Fee-Shifting Cases, 252 F.R.D. 551, 556 (2009). 
 156 See id. (noting novices may not know the risks of rejecting Rule 68 or other settlement offers). 
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Constance Baker Motley put it bluntly: “[T]he most serious problem with Title 
VII litigation today is the paucity of competent and experienced lawyers 
available to plaintiffs.”157 
Consequently, bad brief-writers may exit the field quickly after suffering 
losses, but may still dominate the market: for every one good brief-writer, 
there may be a dozen who prove to lack the briefing chops after a few years, 
such as talented personal injury trial lawyers who try employment law until 
losing several cases. For a plaintiff’s lawyer inexperienced at legally complex 
briefings but skilled at legally simple cases alleging grave wrongs (e.g., major 
personal injuries), employment discrimination litigation may be a siren song—
appealing from a distance, but deadly for reasons unseen until too late to turn 
back. 
2. Lazy Lawyering Pays: A Lawyer’s Troubling Incentive for a Low-Effort 
“Settlement Mill” Strategy, Not Maximizing Case Value 
The second explanation for lawyers taking cases they litigate badly, and 
lose, is more troubling: profitable laziness. Contingency fees, the form of 
payment for most employment discrimination litigation,158 incentivize lawyers 
to minimize hours worked, unless more hours increase not just case value, but 
the lawyer’s 33%–40% share of the value by enough to outweigh the 
opportunity cost.159 This is a principal–agent problem with no perfect solution, 
because hourly pay poses the opposite problem: incentivizing lawyers to 
maximize their hours,160 subject to the constraint of minimizing other costs of 
 
 157 Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 158 With employment litigation typically costing six figures in fees, infra note 165, plaintiffs typically can 
afford at most the few thousand dollars in out-of-pocket litigation costs (exhibits, deposition transcripts, etc.), 
leaving attorneys paid on contingency. See generally James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Expertise and 
Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349, 
350 (1993) (viewing contingency as “a mechanism for financing cases when the plaintiff is liquidity 
constrained and capital markets are imperfect” and for “allow[ing] the attorney and her client to share risk”). 
That is why contingency fees have applied to virtually all employment cases the author litigated in five years 
of full-time practice at a major firm, has continued to litigate in years of occasional co-counseling since then, 
and has seen in other plaintiff-side lawyers’ practices. 
 159 See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1525 (2009) 
(noting that contingency fees induce attorneys “to invest in a claim only up to the point at which further 
investment is not profitable,” likely below what is “optimal . . . for the client”). 
 160 See Dana & Spier, supra note 158, at 350, 364 (noting that attorneys paid hourly “might lead the 
plaintiff blindly into litigation regardless of the case’s merit” and, once in litigation, “have an incentive to 
prevent the case from settling”). 
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working excessive hours, such as opportunity costs and upsetting the client.161 
Full analysis of contingency fee effects and incentives is a complex matter 
beyond the scope of this Article,162 but a narrow point is relevant here: even if 
contingency fees are not clearly worse than hourly fees, in employment cases 
they can make it profitable to file a low-quality brief, despite the risk of 
summary judgment loss. 
Assume a lawyer has a twenty-case portfolio. Some case events are 
mandatory (e.g., attending hearings and party depositions), but others are 
discretionary: deposing more witnesses to poke holes in the defense, issuing 
third-party subpoenas, preparing witnesses for deposition, and researching and 
writing a strong summary judgment brief. Assume high- and low-effort 
strategies as to the discretionary matters yield the following mix of case 
values: (a) a million-dollar verdict for a full trial win (i.e., several years’ lost 
pay plus interest, a modest emotional distress award, punitive damages, and 
low-six-figure attorney’s fees);163 (b) low- to mid-five-figure average 
settlements, ranging from four-figure “nuisance-value” to six figures;164 and 
 
 161 See id. at 364 (noting that, as clients, major corporations like insurance companies are “repeat 
purchaser[s],” which both makes them “better monitors of the attorney’s effort” and gives the attorney “greater 
incentive to invest in her reputation” by avoiding overbilling such clients). 
 162 For an illustrative analysis of how contingency fees unintuitively can incentivize lawyers to file even 
claims with negative expected values, see, for example, Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The 
Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1290 (2006) and infra 
text accompanying note 166, for a model of contingency fee litigation based on “real options theory.” 
 163 See, e.g., Kuper v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 99-CV-1190, 2004 WL 97685, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2004) (awarding $902,835.50—lost pay, $237,500; emotional distress damages, $62,500; 
punitive damages, $200,000; legal fees, $395,605; cost repayment, $7,230.50); Detje v. James River Paper 
Corp., 167 F. Supp. 2d 248, 249 (D. Conn. 2001) (awarding $1,290,760 to ADEA plaintiff as double his lost 
pay upon the “finding that he had been willfully discriminated against” under ADEA double-damages 
provision). 
As to fees, courts reject the argument that fees must be proportional to the verdict. See City of 
Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574, 585 (1986) (plurality joined in part by Justice Powell); Quaratino v. 
Tiffany & Co., 129 F.3d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting proportionality rule for employment claims). Thus 
courts regularly award fees in the low to mid six figures, whether a verdict was large or modest. See, e.g., 
Kuper, 2004 WL 97685, at *1–2; Sherry v. N.Y. Med. Coll., No. 99 Civ. 2310 (LAK), 2000 WL 781867, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2000) (awarding fees of $129,975.20 in ADA and ADEA case that did not even go to trial, 
following pretrial settlement entered as judgment for $175,000); cf. Dodge v. Hunt Petrol. Corp., 174 F. Supp. 
2d 505, 510 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (noting that fees totaled $146,604.40, but reducing award by 75% to $36,651.10, 
because plaintiff won only “on one of her two claims” and only to a “modest” degree). 
 164 Because most cases end on confidential terms, see Moss, supra note 149, at 869, “[e]mpirical research 
in this area is extremely difficult,” ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 19 (2003). Three studies exist, each showing low- to mid-five-figure average settlements. See 
Berrey et al., supra note 7, at 1, 26 (finding an average settlement of $30,000 in a national but more limited 
1988–2003 sample); Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment 
Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 111, 144 (2007) (finding an average settlement of 
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(c) losses in the vast majority of non-settled cases (twelve of thirteen) given 
low effort, but in three-quarters given high effort.165 
TABLE 3: 
Value of 20-Case Portfolio Under Low- and High-Effort Lawyering Strategy 
Strategy 
#Loss 













12 6 2 1 $1,230,000 
High 
Effort 
6 6 6 2 $2,630,000 
A high-effort strategy substantially increases case value: (a) the rare 
million-dollar full trial win is more likely after aggressive discovery increases 
the odds of unearthing strong evidence and forcing the defense to disclose 
more arguments and evidence before trial; (b) large settlements come mainly 
when a plaintiff’s lawyer litigates the case well in discovery or works hard on a 
brief to survive summary judgment; and (c) losses and small nuisance-value 
settlements are less likely when the lawyer both screens out bad cases with 
quality research (factual and legal) and writes quality briefs that get good cases 
past dispositive motions. 
But compared to the low-effort strategy, the high-effort strategy easily can 
multiply the attorney time by more than it increases case value. Anecdotal 
experience confirms this: in contingency cases, elaborate research, discovery, 
and briefings may not be cost-effective investments for plaintiff’s lawyers, 
except in the largest cases. In most cases, it may be most profitable to litigate 
lazily—tolerating losses in most cases, but profiting from (a) minimizing cost 
with the low-effort strategy, (b) amassing many small settlements quickly after 
 
$54,651 in a 1999–2005 database of confidential employment discrimination settlements in the Chicago 
federal court); Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson, and Ryon Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective 
Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 187 (2010) (finding in a sample of 945 cases that median settlement was 
$30,000, with a median of $40,000 for a small number of post–summary judgment settlements). 
 165 Loss rates are high because plaintiffs may lose not only at trial, but pretrial on summary judgment (or 
another dispositive motion); a good brief-writer may survive summary judgment in slightly over half of all 
cases, see supra Part II.B, but then faces roughly a coin toss at trial, making the ex ante win probability about 
25%. Compare George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 18–19 (1984) (noting that with settlements weeding out many cases, trial win rates should “approach 
50 percent,” assuming symmetric information and predictable doctrine), with Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining 
Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 233, 249–52 (1996) (finding, among over 3,500 federal trials in 1980s, that plaintiffs won in 
26.9%, with lower rates in most labor, employment, and civil rights areas). 
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filing those cases, and (c) enjoying the rare big verdict or substantial pretrial 
settlement. 
Worse, even where a high-effort strategy is a good case investment, the 
plaintiff’s lawyer’s incentive is for a low-effort strategy, because contingency 
lawyers enjoy only a fraction of any gain in case value. Assume the following: 
the lawyer is on a one-third contingency fee; the low-effort strategy yields 
expected liability of L, for attorney-fee time of cost C; and the high-effort 
strategy increases cost, but increases expected liability more, with cost rising to 
3C but liability rising to 4L. The high-effort strategy is worthwhile for the case 
but not for the lawyer, who prefers the low-effort profit (L/3 – C) to the high-
effort profit (4L/3 – 3C)—whenever (per simple algebra) L < 2C, which is to 
say whenever case value is not high enough. High effort maximizes case value 
(to the client’s benefit) but passes the point at which the lawyer’s marginal 
revenue (i.e., the 33%–40% share of the amount by which effort increases case 
value) surpasses the marginal cost of additional effort (i.e., the lawyer’s 
opportunity cost of time). 
A critical variant on the low-effort strategy is the more nuanced “litigation 
as . . . option” strategy: file many cases; see which prove promising in early, 
modest-effort pretrial stages (party depositions, initial document exchange, 
etc.); then drop any cases that do not strengthen, focusing effort on the handful 
where the early effort proves strong.166 This theory, based on “real options” 
concepts from securities, explains how the option to drop a case may 
incentivize lawyers to file a large portfolio of seemingly weak cases, in the 
hopes a few will prove strong.167 This strategy can be rational for a lawyer who 
satisfies the following conditions: 
(1) lacks access to cases with high expected values (i.e., a non-
prominent lawyer who does not get the plum cases); 
(2) has access to a large pool of cases with (a) low or even 
negative expected value but (b) high variance in that expected 
value, such that a large portfolio eventually will prove to have 
a few strong cases; 
(3) can learn more about case merit in early pretrial stages; and 
(4) can, during pretrial, drop the cases that do not strengthen.168 
 
 166 Grundfest & Huang, supra note 162, at 1290. 
 167 Id. at 1267–68 (modeling litigation with “options” theory). 
 168 See generally id. (providing an analysis of how contingency fees can incentivize lawyers to file claims 
with negative expected values). 
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The problem is that civil procedure, court, and ethics rules restrict dropping 
cases: a lawyer cannot drop an already-filed federal suit without permission 
from both the client169 and either the court or opposing counsel (either of 
whom may refuse to drop the case if, for example, there is a counterclaim or an 
argument that the suit is frivolous enough to warrant sanctions);170 nor can a 
lawyer simply quit the litigation mid-stream without permission from the client 
or the court.171 
The tension between the appealing “option” strategy (file many middling 
cases and drop any that do not strengthen) and rules restricting case-dropping 
may explain bad briefs: a lawyer may knowingly default on summary judgment 
by filing a hopeless, low-effort brief as a way to drop weak cases unilaterally. 
That tactic would amount to an end-run around the above rules barring lawyers 
from unilaterally dropping cases, and it certainly violates the ethical mandates 
of competence and diligence that continue to apply until and unless an attorney 
has permission to withdraw from, or to voluntarily dismiss, his or her case.172 
In sum, the litigation-as-option theory is rational, and may be fine to pursue as 
long as lawyers consult clients and win court permission before dropping 
cases. But lawyers’ incentives to maximize their case-dropping freedom may 
explain why they file hopelessly low-effort briefs—to evade important rules 
barring unilateral case-dropping. 
The above analysis shows how, based on various similar strategies, a 
profit-maximizing lawyer may choose a low-effort strategy yielding losses and 
token settlements in most cases. This may be what bad-writing plaintiffs’ 
lawyers do: by declining to spend much time on briefings or discovery, they 
enjoy the low costs that make it profitable to live off quick nuisance-value 
settlements. Personal injury lawyers with similar practices draw criticism as 
“[s]ettlement mills[,] . . . high-volume personal injury practices that . . . take 
few—if any—cases to trial.”173 The bad-writing employment lawyers are 
similar, and their clients face similar outcomes: “those with unmeritorious 
claims . . . [or] meritorious but very small claims, fare reasonably well. On the 
other hand, those with particularly meritorious claims[,] . . . and those with 
 
 169 ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s 
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . . shall abide by a client’s decision whether to 
settle a matter.”). 
 170 FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) (indicating the permission of all counsel suffices to allow voluntary 
dismissal); id. at 41(a)(2) (indicating the permission of a judge suffices to allow voluntary dismissal). 
 171 See supra note 126 (detailing the requirement of court permission for attorney to withdraw). 
 172 See supra note 129 (detailing such rules). 
 173 Engstrom, supra note 159, at 1491. 
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meritorious claims who are seriously injured, likely fare relatively poorly”174—
their lawyers’ low-effort strategy, yielding no credible threat of trial, pools 
meritorious claimants together with unmeritorious claimants to receive 
nuisance-value settlements.175 Incentives to litigate lazily may trump lawyers’ 
ethical obligations to represent clients “zealously” and to serve clients’ 
interests by doing work that benefits their cases. 
3. Who Are the Bad Brief-Writers? An Odd Mix Indicating That Lazy-
Lawyering “Settlement Mills” Are Likely Not the Entire Problem 
Identifying two very different causes of bad briefing—ignorant 
overoptimism and knowing laziness—is unsatisfying, because the solution 
depends on the problem. Scrutiny of the nature of each lawyer’s practice can 
hint at answers, but lawyers’ practice areas cannot be pinned down with 
statistical accuracy. Many lawyers claim multiple expertise areas. Other 
lawyers have websites claiming expertise in a field in which they merely aspire 
to practice. Searching reported decisions or dockets also is inconclusive, 
because practice areas differ in yielding filings. A lawyer with mainly state-
court personal injury and criminal cases, but only a little federal employment 
law, would appear in a federal docket search to be an employment lawyer. 
Docket searching is even less helpful for lawyers who mix litigation with 
transactional work yielding no court filings at all. Consequently, this Article 
could not feature a truly quantitative study of the practice areas of the lawyers 
who wrote the briefs in the data set. 
But the tentative evidence is that most of the bad brief-writers are not 
employment lawyers; most appear to be personal injury or general practice 
lawyers. Extensive searching of the worst brief-writers’ websites, listings in 
online directories, LinkedIn pages, etc., showed that the sixteen lawyers who 
wrote the very worst briefs (those cited and described in the Part II.A.1–5 
listing of the worst briefs) broke down as follows by practice area176: 
  
 
 174 Id. at 1490. 
 175 Id. at 1527 (noting low sizes of settlements at settlement mills, typically $2,000 to $6,000). 
 176 The data underlying this search are on file with the author. The two “unknown” practices reflect that, 
by the time of this study, one lawyer was deceased while another left private practice for a government job; 
neither left a residual internet footprint about his practice area. 
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TABLE 4: 
The Worst Brief-Writers, by Reported Practice Area 
Practice Area Number 
General Practice 7 of 16 
Employment Law 4 of 16 
Personal Injury 3 of 16 
Unknown 2 of 16 
These figures are imprecise, as noted earlier: the seven lawyers who market 
a general practice may actually have mostly employment cases; the four 
professed employment lawyers may be inexperienced or general practitioners 
who want to market themselves in employment cases. But the disparity 
between these lawyers’ abilities and their bragging is striking. The lawyers 
whose websites feature the below boasts are the ones whose briefs were the 
very worst—not just devoid of a same-actor rebuttal, but either incoherent, 
research-empty, or both: 
• Personal injury lawyer who defaulted on summary 
judgment177: “[W]e have developed a reputation in Indiana 
and the Chicagoland area for aggressive, yet thoughtful 
representation. . . . We are experienced; We are Aggressive; 
and We Want You to Win.”178 
• General practice firm whose brief was pervasively 
ungrammatical179: “an attorney that you know and trust, one 
whom you can call on and be assured that your matter will be 
given full attention by skilled and knowledgeable legal 
practitioners dedicated to fulfilling your needs.”180 
• General practitioner whose brief cited only three boilerplate 
cases on the discrimination claim181: “Ours is not a cookie-
 
 177 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 178 KELLY LAW OFFICES, http://www.tfklawfirm.com (last visited Aug. 15, 2013). 
 179 See supra note 92 and accompanying text (citing and quoting brief featuring four ungrammatical 
sentences in just the four-paragraph “Preliminary Statement,” which also failed to say what kind of 
discrimination (race, sex, etc.) Plaintiffs claimed). 
 180 LAW OFFICES OF BARRY D. HABERMAN, http://www.bhaberman.com (defunct as of June 7, 2013), 
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20130113000431/http://www.bhaberman.com/ (last visited Aug. 15, 
2013). 
 181 See supra note 109 and accompanying text (citing and quoting brief). 
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cutter practice,” but a “practice promot[ing] visionary tenacity, 
flexibility, [and] creativity.”182 
The contrast is notable: many of the 27% filing good briefs, but none of the 
73% filing bad briefs, are expert plaintiff-side employment litigators who 
publish in the field, speak at major conferences, and serve as bar association 
leaders.183 
This review of lawyers’ practice areas does not conclusively pinpoint the 
problem. The prevalence of general practitioners could show that 
overoptimism is the main explanation: perhaps these are the lawyers who try 
employment litigation, lose cases, then leave. Or it could mean settlement mills 
span subject matters: perhaps these lawyers litigate on the cheap and settle 
quickly with a docket of employment, personal injury, and other cases. 
But this practice area review does hint that settlement mills cannot be the 
whole story. If it were, we would see multi-lawyer employment firms enjoying 
the fruits of lazy lawyering in the field—but just one of sixteen bad brief-
writers was at an employment-focused firm with more than one or two 
lawyers. The practice area data therefore indicate that (a) even if lazy-
lawyering settlement mills are part of the story, the problem spans practice 
areas, because employment law does not appear especially apt to support a 
settlement-mill practice, and therefore also that (b) overoptimism is likely a 
key explanation for bad briefings. 
 
 182 LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J. FLEISCHMANN & ASSOCIATES, http://fleischmannlaw.com/firm.html (last 
visited Aug. 15, 2013). 
 183 A count of “top” lawyers would be arbitrary: some bar leaders are mediocre lawyers, many lawyers 
reside at various points along a spectrum from prominence to anonymity, and many excellent lawyers never 
take on prominent roles. What is notable is that top plaintiff-side employment lawyers like the following were 
among the 27% of good brief-writers, but not among the 73% of bad ones. Kathleen Peratis, former ACLU 
Women’s Rights Project director, is a published author and a partner at New York’s largest plaintiff-side 
employment firm. Kathleen Peratis, OUTTEN & GOLDEN, http://www.outtengolden.com/lawyer-attorney/ 
kathleen-peratis (last visited Aug. 15, 2013). L. Steven Platt, a Chicago law firm partner, is a regular CLE 
speaker and author who was formerly on the Board of Directors, and Illinois chapter President, of the National 
Employment Lawyers Association. L. Steven Platt, CLARK HILL, http://www.clarkhill.com/Attorney/splatt 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2013). Carolyn Shapiro, a law professor and former Supreme Court clerk, wrote her brief 
at a major Chicago plaintiff-side civil rights firm. Carolyn Shapiro, IIT CHI.-KENT COLL. L., http://www. 
kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/full-time-faculty/carolyn-shapiro (last visited Aug. 15, 2013). Michael Sussman, now in 
a rural New York practice, litigated at the NAACP and Department of Justice Civil Rights Division. Michael 
H. Sussman, SUSSMAN & WATKINS, http://www.sussmanwatkinslaw.com/attorneys_staff/sussman.html (last 
visited Aug. 15, 2013). 
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C. Bad Ethics Enforcement: Why Do the Bar and Judiciary Tolerate 
Widespread Incompetence in a Major Field of Law? 
As detailed above, when a defendant presses the same-actor defense in a 
circuit with split authority, a plaintiff’s lawyer’s professional responsibility 
includes finding and arguing the contrary authority.184 Yet the 73% of briefs 
failing to cite same-actor caselaw fail this basic duty,185 and a substantial 
fraction badly fail basic professional standards with incoherent writing, a lack 
of research, a failure to address the defense at all, or even a full default on the 
motion.186 But remarkably, in none of the over 100 cases with an inadequate 
plaintiff’s brief did the judges issue orders sanctioning the lawyers or referring 
them to the bar for possible discipline—two types of orders judges know how 
to issue when troubled by a lawyer.187 It is puzzling why judges do not act 
against such clearly deficient lawyering; three possible answers exist, each 
plausible but troubling. 
1. The Difficulty of Knowing not only What Plaintiffs’ Counsel Should 
Have Argued, but also What Errors Are Harmless 
A judge or other observer may be able to spot a bad brief, but not what 
particular arguments a lawyer should have made. As noted above, when a 
plaintiff’s lawyer does not argue a point, it may not be clear whether the 
lawyer failed or whether the facts failed to support more argument on the 
point.188 Even where an error is purely legal and is therefore apparent (such as 
a failure to make readily available arguments against a same-actor defense), it 
is hard to know if the error is harmless because a competent version of the 
brief was never written; perhaps the plaintiff would have lost anyway. 
Unprofessional lawyering should not be tolerated even if arguably a “harmless 
error,” because future clients may suffer at the hands of the unprofessional 
lawyer. Yet the more a lawyer’s error is harmless to his or her client, the easier 
it is to understand judicial reluctance to initiate sanctions or disciplinary 
proceedings, which can be burdensome, as detailed below. 
 
 184 See supra Part I.A.2 (detailing legal writing treatises, cases, and ethics rules so instructing). 
 185 See supra Part II.A. 
 186 See supra Part II.A.1–5. 
 187 See, e.g., In re Amgen Inc., No. 10-MC-0249 (SLT)(JO), 2011 WL 2442047, at *20 n.26 (E.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 6, 2011) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1464 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting “sanctions[] such as 
holding [attorneys] in contempt or referral to the state bar for disciplinary proceedings” (internal quotation 
mark omitted)). 
 188 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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2. Bureaucracy and Controversy Avoidance 
Judges have heavy dockets, and the largely volunteer lawyers staffing 
disciplinary committees have limited time. Given the large quantity of poor 
lawyering this Article documents, sanctioning or disciplining bad lawyering 
risks opening the floodgates, especially given how time-consuming each 
individual proceeding would be. “‘[D]ue process requires that courts provide 
notice and an opportunity to be heard before imposing any kind of [attorney] 
sanctions,’”189 and because sanctions and disciplinary action inflict permanent 
stains on attorneys’ records, such inquiries are hotly disputed and subject to 
appeal—making sanctions and disciplinary proceedings unappealing endeavors 
for judges and bar committees. 
3. Raising the Cost of Litigation as Harmful to the Plaintiff’s Side—Even if 
the Rate of Bad Writing Is Similar on Both Sides 
A major caveat of this Article’s findings is that it does not prove plaintiffs’ 
lawyers are worse than defendants’. The data sample starts with defense briefs 
that do make the same-actor argument, and it is hard to know if a defendant’s 
moving brief omitted the same-actor argument because the lawyer did not 
know the law or because the facts failed to support the point. Because this 
Article cannot assess the frequency of defense counsel knowing to make an 
argument, it cannot assess whether plaintiffs’ briefs are worse than 
defendants’. But even if a similar crackdown might apply to plaintiffs and 
defendants, increased odds of sanctions or discipline for bad writers could, on 
the whole, harm plaintiffs: increasing the risk and attorney time of a case 
disincentivizes filing suit.190 Consequently, any writing crackdown could face 
dueling bias accusations: plaintiffs’ lawyers could claim it burdens lawsuits 
with an extra threat; their opponents could claim it is an effort to restrict new 
competitors from entering the plaintiffs’ bar. 
 
 189 Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Nuwesra v. Merrill Lynch, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc., 174 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (holding the same for a monetary sanction) 
(reversing the sanction of an order removing an attorney from the case, where the order was imposed without 
adequate briefing and hearing). 
 190 See David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 74 & n.1 (1983) 
(analyzing evidence that “[r]ising costs are seen as a barrier to some and a problem for all litigants,” including 
pretrial disputes that delay litigation and increase the required attorney time); cf. Berrey et al., supra note 7, at 
21–22 (noting that plaintiffs’ out-of-pocket expenses disincentivize them from filing suit). 
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IV.  POSSIBLE REDRESS 
A. The Caveats: A Degree of Judicial Blame and a Degree of Intractability 
This Article does not mean to overstate the point that plaintiffs’ summary 
judgment losses trace to bad briefs. Often courts just get it wrong, defying Rule 
56 standards too established to blame the lawyers. For example, in Nagle v. 
Village of Calumet Park, the court dismissed a claim that a police chief 
retaliated against an officer who filed a discrimination charge.191 On summary 
judgment, plaintiffs merit favorable inferences from uncertain facts, yet the 
court in Nagle rejected evidence plausibly but not conclusively showing the 
chief knew of the discrimination charge: 
The EEOC charge was mailed to the department on January 27, 
2005, . . . to “Chief David” rather than Chief Davis. . . . [and] the 
envelope was addressed to “Personnel Manager, Human Resources 
Department, Village of Calumet Park.” . . . [F]rom this 
evidence[,] . . . no jury could reasonably conclude that Chief Davis 
was aware of the EEOC charge . . . [as] of the February 2005 
suspension.192 
Next the Nagle court granted Defendant summary judgment against Plaintiff’s 
claim that his reassignment was “adverse,” despite admitting the evidence 
“cuts both ways”: 
While one can imagine . . . reassignment to less desirable . . . 
positions would dissuade a reasonable worker from making a 
charge[,] . . . the senior liaison position was posted . . . , and after no 
one applied, Nagle was assigned to [it]. . . . [A]n employer . . . . 
cannot assign an employee to a less favored position because [he] . . . 
exercised his statutory rights. 193  
“[But] [t]his fact arguably cuts both ways: the senior liaison position had to be 
filled by some-one [sic] and an employer is entitled to fill the position.”194 
The Nagle panel was not particularly ideologically identifiable: two of the 
judges were Democratic appointees,195 and none had a reputation as unusually 
 
 191 554 F.3d 1106, 1111 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 192 Id. at 1122. 
 193 Id. at 1120. 
 194 Id.  
 195 Judge Ann Claire Williams and Terence T. Evans were appointed by President Bill Clinton. See Jason 
J. Czarnezki and William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of Legal 
Interpretation, 65 MD. L. REV. 841, 856 tbl.1 (2006). 
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hostile to plaintiffs. Nagle therefore is an example of the empirical finding that 
judges’ backgrounds and life experiences, but not their simple political 
affiliation, influence the rate at which they dismiss employment discrimination 
cases on summary judgment.196 In short, stretching summary judgment 
standards to dismiss cases is a wide-ranging phenomenon, as shown by not 
only cases like Nagle and empirical studies, but the first-hand report by retired 
judge Nancy Gertner of how federal judges are trained “to get rid of civil rights 
cases”: “At the start of my judicial career in 1994, the trainer teaching 
discrimination law to new judges announced, ‘Here’s how to get rid of civil 
rights cases[]’ . . . .”197 
Despite the role of judicial error or unfairness, this Article’s diagnosis 
remains: while good plaintiffs’ briefs are not always lifesavers, bad briefs are 
deadly. They concede contestable points, overwhelmingly lose, and generate 
pro-defense caselaw; they thereby hurt not only the losing plaintiff, but future 
plaintiffs who face the increased pro-defense caselaw that bad plaintiffs’ briefs 
yield. Accordingly, without exonerating judges, this Article finds bad 
lawyering is a previously overlooked, troubling contributor to plaintiffs’ 
summary judgment loss rate and to the heavy body of debatable pro-defense 
caselaw. 
So what can be done? There is no perfect solution, given that information 
gaps and troubling incentives render the legal services market deeply flawed: 
• clients lack sufficient access to, or ability to understand, 
information on research and writing quality differences among 
lawyers (Part III.A); 
• many lawyers lack sufficient information, until after years of 
losing cases, about how employment law requires more 
research and writing than many other fields of small-firm 
practice (Part III.B.1); 
• other lawyers are all too well-informed about the potential 
profitability of litigating on the cheap, minimizing lawyer 
effort to maximize per-hour profit even while sacrificing 
victory odds (Part III.B.2); and 
 
 196 Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, and 
Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 320–21 (2012) (“Our data show . . . that white judges tend 
to dismiss cases for summary judgment at a higher rate than minority judges. . . . [but] no political party 
effects, suggesting judicial decisionmaking may be less influenced by political ideology than some political 
scientists suggest and more influenced by experience.”). 
 197 Gertner, supra note 139, at 117. 
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• judges and bar authorities feel ill-positioned to discipline 
lawyers due to heavy dockets, information limitations, and 
fear that a crackdown would (or would be perceived to) harm 
plaintiffs by increasing litigation risk (Part III.C). 
In this light, the legal services market is just like many other flawed markets in 
which ill-informed buyers suffer at the hands of unscrupulous or incompetent 
sellers whom regulators lack the firepower or the will to police. 
While Part III paints a bleak picture, this Part offers some hope of 
improving matters with targeted reforms—a mix of modestly helpful measures 
and more aggressive measures that carry both intriguing promise and 
substantial risks. 
B. Increasing Lawyer Training with Educational Efforts and Reforms 
One direct response to poor lawyering is to improve educational efforts for 
practicing lawyers (subpart 1 below) and law students (subpart 2). While it is 
hard to fault educational efforts, they hold limited promise: it is unclear 
whether more education truly can make bad lawyers better, much less convince 
unethical lawyers to work harder for modest returns. 
1. Supporting Bar Association Outreach 
The easiest prescription is expanding outreach and educational efforts by 
bar associations with substantial plaintiff-side membership, such as the 
National Employment Lawyers Association (exclusively plaintiff-side 
employment lawyers), the American Association for Justice (plaintiff-side trial 
lawyers), or more broad-based state and local bar associations, especially those 
with divisions on litigation or employment law.198 
First, such entities should maximally share, by publishing and posting on 
websites, articles and sample briefs helping plaintiffs’ lawyers oppose 
summary judgment motions. Bar associations may be reluctant to give away 
what dues-paying members buy, but as this Article shows, bad plaintiffs’ briefs 
produce negative externalities by polluting the caselaw for all, thereby 
justifying collective prevention efforts. Second, associations should expand 
 
 198 See, e.g., NAT’L EMP. LAW. ASS’N, http://www.nela.org/NELA/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) (“NELA 
is the country’s largest professional organization that is exclusively comprised of lawyers who represent 
individual employees in cases involving employment discrimination and other employment-related matters. 
NELA and its 68 state and local affiliates have more than 3000 members.”).  
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mind-sharing initiatives, such as moot courts and listservs. Mooting is common 
for appeals, but as this Article shows, the plaintiff’s bar has a major problem 
with the trial court summary judgment motions that are the pivotal, dispositive 
events in so many cases. Listservs, powerful means for sharing research and 
enlisting motion guidance, exist in active large-state and big-city chapters;199 
they could more actively invite participation from smaller neighboring states 
lacking a large plaintiff’s bar.200 
Public support could help these modest private ordering initiatives, which 
by themselves lack a governmental entity’s resources or ability to reach 
disengaged lawyers. All except the most prominent national bar associations 
typically run on a shoestring; most lack office space, conference rooms, mock 
courtrooms, or the funding to procure such space for events. Even modest 
government support could make a real difference. For example, public entities 
could provide free use of courtrooms, or rooms in other public buildings, for 
bar associations and small-firm lawyers to hold moot courts or continuing legal 
education events that more affluent firms can host in-house. 
2. Experiential Learning Targeting the Writing That Lawyers Do Badly 
While this Article documents one shortcoming in lawyer performance, the 
broader criticism, that lawyers need better training at practice skills, is not new. 
In 1992, the “MacCrate Report”—a detailed critique of legal education by the 
American Bar Association’s Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession, 
chaired by Robert MacCrate—offered a “comprehensive effort to address the 
lack of competence among graduating lawyers,”201 including numerous 
recommendations for law schools to do better at making graduates “well-
 
 199 See, e.g., Advocates for Employee Rights, NAT’L EMP. LAW. ASS’N/N.Y., http://www.nelany.com/EN/ 
index.cfm?event=showPage&pg=whoweare (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) (offering listservs through a link 
under the member services tab and explaining that “NELA/NY, the local affiliate of the National Employment 
Lawyers Association . . ., advances and encourages the professional development of its [more than 400] 
members through networking, educational programs, publications and technical support”). 
 200 For example, while the NELA state chapters in Colorado, New York, and Illinois have active listservs, 
those in smaller neighboring states do not. The Illinois-based listserv actively includes those elsewhere in the 
Seventh Circuit (i.e., Wisconsin and Indiana), and New York’s listserv draws some participation from 
neighboring states, but Colorado’s does not draw participation from the handful of members in the more 
sparsely populated neighboring states. 
 201 Russell Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10: Assessing Its Impact and Identifying Gaps We Should 
Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 115 (2001). 
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trained . . . . to practice law competently and professionally.”202 But the 
MacCrate Report was not the first such effort, having been preceded by “the 
Reed Report (1921), the writings of Jerome Frank in the 1930’s and 1940’s, 
and the Crampton Report (1979),” as well as “[t]he growth of clinical legal 
education beginning in the 1970’s . . . [upon] demands for relevance in the law 
school curriculum.”203 By the 1990s, the diagnosis was pervasive that “law 
schools are quite successful in teaching substantive law and the basic skills of 
problem-solving, legal reasoning, and writing, but they have not devoted 
comparable attention to practice skills.”204 
Following these criticisms, many have called for more “experiential 
learning” in law schools: clinical legal education representing live clients or 
otherwise participating in real legal matters; internships and externships in 
which students work for real lawyers; and law school courses teaching 
practical lawyering skills, such as writing briefs, drafting contracts, 
negotiating, and trying cases.205 Such offerings have proven popular with 
students,206 and while it is hard to assess educational efficacy, there is evidence 
experiential learning imparts useful skills. Lawyers give high marks to the 
usefulness of most forms even years later,207 and experiential learning may 
even improve abstract thinking skills as well. In one study comparing student 
aptitudes before and after these offerings, “the data . . . support the notion that 
an experiential approach in the classroom may impact student learning in a 
positive way.”208 “[P]articularly among students who began their law school 
 
 202 AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION ON LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHS. & 
THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN 
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 125 (1992). 
 203 Engler, supra note 201, at 115 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 204 Wallace Loh, The MacCrate Report: Heuristic or Prescriptive?, 69 WASH. L. REV. 505, 510 (1994). 
 205 See generally Nantiya Ruan, Experiential Learning in the First-Year Curriculum: The Public-Interest 
Partnership, 8 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: 191, 191–94, 197–99 (2011) (surveying types of experiential 
learning). 
 206 Karen Sloan, Recent Graduates Report Satisfaction with ‘Real World’ Training in Law School, NAT’L 
L.J. (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202490652136 (citing growing 
“prevailing wisdom . . . that law schools should provide more practical skills and ‘real world’ training,” and 
reporting survey data that “clinics and externships are gaining in popularity,” and “[p]ractical skills courses 
proved most popular”). 
 207 Debra Cassens Weiss, Associate Survey Gives Low Marks to Law School Pro Bono, Props to Legal 
Clinics, ABA J. (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_school_pro_bono_not_so_ 
useful_associate_survey_finds (citing survey of law firm associates about the usefulness of any experiential 
learning they had in law school: “[t]he average usefulness rating, with four being most useful, was 3.4 for legal 
clinics and externships, 3.1 for skills courses, and 2.2 for pro bono”). 
 208 Eric A. DeGroff, Training Tomorrow’s Lawyers: What Empirical Research Can Tell Us About the 
Effect of Law School Pedagogy on Student Learning Styles, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 251, 254 (2012). 
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careers with relatively undeveloped analytical skills,” data indicate experiential 
learning “may . . . develop[] and encourag[e] the use of law students’ abstract 
thinking skills.”209 
Experiential learning also draws criticism. Legal education requires “not 
only the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and values, but also theory and 
policy”; arguably, “pressure on law schools to teach this set of skills, 
regardless of the opportunity costs,” risks a “‘McDonalds-ization’” of law 
schools.210 Further, given the varied “capability and resources of law faculties 
to offer it,”211 experiential learning may be successful at one school but not 
another, or in one form but not another (e.g., clinics versus externships). This 
Article cannot resolve these debates, but its diagnosis, that lawyers perform a 
major skill badly, supports particular types of experiential learning. 
First, as Erwin Chemerinsky has argued, education in writing briefs should 
focus more on the trial court motions, which all litigators regularly handle, 
than on appeals, which new lawyers rarely litigate and which rarely 
predominate even experienced lawyers’ practices: “Most first-year legal 
writing classes conclude with an appellate brief and argument,” but students 
instead could “argue a motion to dismiss or a summary judgment motion, 
something more likely to be seen . . . in their early years of practice.”212 
Second, the highest-stakes writing in plaintiffs’ litigation is opposing such 
dispositive motions (i.e., motions to dismiss and for summary judgment), 
which is “responsive writing” in opposition to a motion, rather than the writing 
of one’s own motion—and “[m]ost law school persuasive writing assignments 
are nonresponsive.”213 This Article supports more experiential learning in, or at 
least tweaking the existing writing curriculum toward, responsive writing in 
dispositive motions. It more broadly supports expanded experiential learning in 
the sort of complex federal law briefings required on summary judgment 
motions—not the sort of skill experiential learning opponents can easily deride 
as unintellectual, given that a good summary judgment brief marshals a range 
of arguments, sources, and ideas that are at least as intellectually challenging 
as a law school seminar paper.214 
 
 209 Id. at 284. 
 210 Loh, supra note 204, at 512–13. 
 211 Id. at 513. 
 212 Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking Legal Education, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 595, 597 (2008). 
 213 NEUMANN, supra note 61, at 325 n.1. 
 214 Chemerinsky, supra note 212, at 597 (“[A]n emphasis on skills training is often thought to be the 
opposite of teaching theory and interdisciplinary perspectives. This is a false dichotomy that law schools 
MOSS GALLEYSPROOFS3 9/26/2013 10:42 AM 
2013] BAD BRIEFS, BAD LAW, BAD MARKETS 113 
3. Making Substantive Employment Discrimination Law Simpler and a Bar 
Examination Topic 
As noted above, employment discrimination law is “a relatively specialized 
field, between the complicated proof structures and the complex theoretical 
foundation,”215 making it “complex for those who do not regularly practice in 
this field.”216 But it need not be: many call for reforming employment 
discrimination law, replacing its labyrinthine “seven-step inquiry”217 and 
“definitional incoherence”218 with a streamlined focus on simply whether 
discrimination caused a challenged action.219 Such proposals draw support in 
this Article’s finding that existing doctrine not only flummoxes most lawyers, 
but is complex enough that generalist judges do not know the doctrine well 
enough to avoid being influenced by disparities in brief quality.220 
The growth of employment discrimination into one of the truly major 
federal practice areas also supports making it a bar examination topic. Most 
states do not test employment discrimination, but Pennsylvania does.221 What 
topics bar examinations should cover is beyond the scope of this Article, 
except to note that bar authorities should consider whether their lists of 
covered subjects have kept up with the times when they lack employment 
discrimination, one of the top fields of litigation, yet include topics such as 
“Trusts & Future Interests”222 “Guardianship,”223 “Workers’ 
Compensation,”224 “Suretyship,”225 and “Bulk Transfers.”226 
 
should emphatically reject. . . . [L]aw is inherently interdisciplinary and must be shaped by understanding 
fields such as economics, philosophy, and psychology.”). 
 215 McCormick, supra note 154, at 65–66. 
 216 Abrams & Winter, supra note 153, at 27. 
 217 See Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for 
Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 671 (1998) (calling for simplifying 
employment discrimination doctrine because the existing burden-shifting scheme requires “a cumbersome 
analysis . . . [that] entails a seven-step inquiry”). 
 218 See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in 
Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 493 (2006) (arguing that employment discrimination law suffers 
“definitional incoherence” because “myriad causal formulations” apply to different types of cases, causing 
“uncertainty over the causation requirement . . . [that] has given rise to vast amounts of needless, expensive 
litigation”). 
 219 See, e.g., Chin & Golinsky, supra note 217, at 671–72; Katz, supra note 218, at 493. 
 220 See supra Part II.C (finding that even among only defense grants of summary judgment, whether 
judges credit the same-actor defense depends on whether the plaintiff briefed the defense). 
 221 Bar Exam Tests and Topics Tested, PA. BOARD L. EXAMINERS, http://www.pabarexam.org/bar_exam_ 
information/testsubjects.htm (last updated Aug. 2, 2013) (listing fifteen subjects, including “Employment 
Discrimination”). 
 222 Bar Exam Guide, NAT’L JURIST, http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/bar-exam-guide (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2013) (listing “Trusts & Future Interests” in California and others states). 
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C. Increasing Client Information About Lawyers by Liberalizing Ethics Rules 
on Marketing and Broadening Public Access to Litigation Filings 
Because some clients could make informed decisions among lawyers yet 
lack enough information, this subpart discusses two informational measures: 
liberalizing ethics rules that restrict lawyer claims of expertise (subpart 1) and 
broadening public access to lawyers’ litigation filings (subpart 2). 
1. Liberalizing Ethics Rules Restricting Lawyer Claims of Expertise 
Certain ethics rules largely bar lawyers from professing to be certified 
specialists in their areas of law. The following is the relevant ethics rule: 
Rule 7.4 Communication of Fields of Practice and Specialization . . . 
(d) A lawyer shall not state or imply . . . certificat[ion] as a 
specialist . . . unless: (1) the lawyer has been certified as a specialist 
by an organization that has been approved by an appropriate state 
authority or that has been accredited by the American Bar 
Association; and (2) the name of the certifying organization is clearly 
identified in the communication.227 
The unhelpfully narrow exceptions are that a lawyer may communicate (a) the 
mere fact that he or she “does or does not practice in particular fields” at all228 
and (b) two highly specific areas of expertise, “Patent Attorney”229 and 
“Proctor in Admiralty.”230 
A split exists on the Rule 7.4 Comment letting lawyers claim specialties, 
just not official “certification”: “A lawyer is generally permitted to state that 
the lawyer is a ‘specialist,’ . . . or ‘specializes in’ particular fields, . . . subject 
to the ‘false and misleading’ standard applied in Rule 7.1 to communications 
 
 223 Id. (listing Texas bar subjects). 
 224 Id. (listing Montana bar subjects). 
 225 Id. (listing Illinois bar subjects). 
 226 Id. (listing Tennessee bar subjects). 
 227 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.4 (2009). 
 228 Id. R. 7.4(a). 
 229 Id. R. 7.4(b) (allowing “the designation ‘Patent Attorney’ or . . . similar” title if “admitted to engage in 
patent practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office”). 
 230 Id. R. 7.4(c) (allowing “the designation . . . ‘Proctor in Admiralty’ or a substantially similar 
designation” if “engaged in Admiralty practice”). 
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concerning a lawyer’s services.”231 States such as Florida hold the opposite: “A 
lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is . . . a ‘specialist.’”232 
This Article’s finding that many nonspecialists simply cannot file 
competent briefs supports permitting lawyers more, not less, leeway to convey 
a field of expertise. Massachusetts’s Rule 7.4 liberalization lets lawyers “hold 
themselves out publicly as specialists” with enhanced accuracy, disclosure, and 
competence duties: 
(a) Lawyers may hold themselves out publicly as specialists in 
particular services [and] fields . . . if [doing so] . . . does not include a 
false or misleading communication[,]. . . . includ[ing] a statement that 
the lawyer concentrates in, specializes in, is certified in, has expertise 
in, or limits practice to a particular service, field, or area . . . . 
(c) . . . [L]awyers who associate their names with a particular service, 
field, or area of law imply an expertise and shall be held to the 
standard of performance of specialists in that particular service, field, 
or area.233 
Admittedly, advertising a specialty risks misleading, and even accurate 
claims may not maximally draw clients to the best lawyers. But many lawyers 
litigate cases in which no well-informed client would hire them—a problem 
worsened by rules preventing actual specialists from informing clients of the 
expertise that substantially improves the effectiveness of their representation. 
2. Making Lawyers’ Filings Free and More Searchable by Laypeople and 
Potential Reviewers 
Allowing specialty marketing may increase client information on what 
lawyers claim, but there is a more direct way to increase information on 
lawyers’ performance: make litigation filings free to obtain and searchable by 
laypeople and those who might seek to review lawyers’ performance. 
For several years, lawyers have had to e-file all federal case filings; some 
such filings are textually searchable PDFs, allowing character-recognition 
content-searching and appearing on Westlaw or Lexis in plain-text form. 
Admittedly, non-lawyer plaintiffs cannot spot failure to cite precedents, and 
many cannot assess lawyer writing at all—but many can. This author has 
 
 231 Id. R. 7.4 cmt.1. 
 232 FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-7.2(c)(6) (2013). The only exception to this bar in Florida is 
where the lawyer is certified by a state bar and displays the name of the certifying organization. Id. 
 233 MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.4 (2013) (emphases added). 
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represented non-English-speaking and uneducated clients unable to read 
briefs,234 but also professionals quite able to spot good and bad writing;235 in 
between are many of this author’s non-college-educated clients who still are 
savvy enough to read both sides’ briefs and spot whether a brief tells a 
persuasive story, rebuts the other side’s arguments, etc.236 
Massive improvement in public accessibility should be a key benefit of 
mandating e-filing of litigation documents. Yet the current e-filing system is so 
primitive it not only provides almost no value to laypeople, but is cumbersome 
to search even for experts. Searching the text of litigation filings requires a 
paid Westlaw or Lexis subscription, because only those private services, not 
the courts, use basic character-recognition software to create plain-text 
versions; almost no layperson has such a subscription, and even for experts, 
those paid databases are incomplete, missing numerous filings (such as those 
this study could find only on PACER). Searching court dockets requires a 
subscription to PACER that is publicly available, though not quite free; 
downloads are ten cents a page,237 which can be substantial for laypeople and 
can add up for researchers trying to review filings from many lawyers. Finally, 
PACER is not easily searchable: each of the ninety-three federal districts has a 
separate PACER site, making cumbersome a search for all filings by a lawyer 
or firm; and the search process is infeasible for laypeople, as detailed below. 
(1) Searching by attorney is possible only by unintuitively 
entering the attorney rather than party name as the case 
“name.” 
(2) The search result is a list of hyperlinked case names, with no 
way to tell which feature briefings and which do not. 
 
 234 E.g., Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating. Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d 184, 185–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(granting non-English-speaking deliverymen partial summary judgment in wage class action); Liu v. Donna 
Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (barring immigration status discovery in non-
English-speaking garment workers’ wage class action). 
 235 E.g., Sarmiento v. Queens College CUNY, 153 Fed. App’x 21, 21–22 (2d Cir. 2005) (ruling on an 
anthropologist’s racial discrimination and retaliation claims); EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 324 F. Supp. 
2d 451, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (deciding Daubert motions in financial professionals’ pattern and practice sex 
discrimination case); Sherry v. N.Y. Med. Coll., No. 99 Civ. 2310(LAK), 2000 WL 781867, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 19, 2000) (granting plaintiff, a doctor, attorney’s fees on her age discrimination and FMLA claims). 
 236 E.g., Reyes v. Snowcap Creamery, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1233–34 (D. Colo. 2012) (denying 
immigration status discovery on cook’s wage claims); Marini v. Adamo, 812 F. Supp. 2d 243, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 
2011) (denying summary judgment on RICO and securities fraud claims of a successful but non-college-
educated small business owner). 
 237 Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule, PACER (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.pacer.gov/documents/epa_ 
feesched.pdf.  
MOSS GALLEYSPROOFS3 9/26/2013 10:42 AM 
2013] BAD BRIEFS, BAD LAW, BAD MARKETS 117 
(3) Each case name links to an unintuitive list; seeing filings 
requires clicking not “attorney” or “history/documents,” but 
“docket report.” 
(4) Clicking “docket report” yields a list of all parties’ lawyers 
followed by a typically multi-page list of all filings, each in 
terminology likely to leave laypeople unclear which of dozens 
or hundreds to read. For example, in one case this author 
litigated, the ten-page docket shows ten lawyers, six parties, 
and 222 docket entries; a layperson looking for the author’s 
brief would need to spot the following entry as “the brief”: 
12/29/2010 116    MEMORANDUM in Opposition re 102 
           Notice of MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment 
           Corrected Memorandum filed by Josephine Marini, 
           Rocco Marini, T&R Knitting Mill, Inc. (Attachments:  
           # 1 Appendix) (Moss, Scott).238 
Such a labyrinthine and jargon-filled process makes PACER possibly the 
Internet’s least user-friendly database, less a “Public” system of “Access” (the 
“P” and “A” in “PACER”) than a virtual world’s Rube Goldberg machine 
concocting ways of “doing simple tasks in convoluted ways.”239 Better 
searchability is almost universal for Internet-accessible content, from not just 
private information providers like Westlaw and Lexis, but online stores, media 
entities, etc.—none of which leave their content in non-textually-searchable 
PDFs not indexed by service provider. 
Federal courts should digitize their content, or negotiate with Westlaw or 
Lexis to share that content, rather than leave essentially inaccessible the 
litigation filings so critical to efforts to review lawyers’ performance. If 
searches were more intuitive, at least some laypeople could review lawyer 
filings for basic competence. Further, if searches were free and could span all 
districts, a better market for lawyer reviews might arise organically, with well-
informed reviewers (e.g., non-practicing lawyers) far better able to provide 
online reviews than they are now. 
 
 238 Docket Sheet, Marini, 812 F. Supp. 2d 243 (No. 2:08-cv-03995). 
 239 “Rube Goldberg was a 20th century cartoonist . . . best known for his depictions of complex devices 
doing simple tasks in convoluted ways.” Gregory L. Fordham, Using Keyword Search Terms in E-Discovery 
and How They Relate to Issues of Responsiveness, Privilege, Evidence Standards, and Rube Goldberg, 15 
RICH. J.L. & TECH., Spring 2009, Article No. 8, at 30. 
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D. Increasing Competent Lawyer Supply by Liberalizing Tester Standing 
Restrictions and Ethics Rules on Corporate Ownership of Law Practices 
Because part of the problem is insufficient supply of competent lawyers, 
this subpart discusses two supply-increasing measures: liberalizing standing-
to-sue restrictions on “testers” filing employment discrimination cases 
(subpart 1) and liberalizing ethics rules barring corporate ownership of law 
practices (subpart 2). 
1. Liberalizing Tester Standing 
[A] “tester” is an individual who, without the intent to 
accept . . . employment, poses as a job applicant . . . to gather 
evidence of discriminat[ion] . . . . [T]he dispatch of pairs of equally 
credentialed candidates, one black and one white . . . . with similar 
personalities and . . . similar backgrounds, credentials, and [job] 
interview techniques. . . . can [yield] invaluable evidence of 
discrimination in the job market.240 
Testers provide “invaluable evidence,” but can they, and organizations who 
dispatch them, sue for the discrimination they uncover? “Courts have differed 
as to whether employment testers have standing under Title VII”: on the one 
hand, a successful “test” shows a core violation—“[t]wo people apply for the 
same position . . . . [and] the company offers the position to [only] the white 
applicant”; on the other hand, “the motives of the employment tester and of a 
bona fide applicant are different—the applicant wants a job while the tester 
wants to uncover evidence,” so testers’ “alleged injuries do not fall within the 
statute.”241 
This Article adds another argument to the debate about testers: because 
most discrimination suits by private parties are litigated so badly, tester suits 
may be more valuable than previously recognized, because the average 
lawyering quality will be stronger. An organization undertaking a major 
endeavor like testing is unlikely to litigate lazily or with ignorance of modern 
discrimination law, as too many private plaintiffs’ lawyers do. One traditional 
argument for restricting standing is that “[t]he likelihood that a party’s 
advocacy will be sufficiently vigorous has traditionally been thought to vary 
 
 240 Michael Bowling, Note, The Case Against Employment Tester Standing Under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981, 101 MICH. L. REV. 235, 236–37 (2002) (first capitalization alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 241 Anthony F. Spalvieri, Note, Employment Testers: Obstacles Standing in the Way of Standing Under 
§ 1981 and Title VII, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 753–55 (2002). 
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with the party’s stake in the outcome”; thus the “traditional rules” restricting 
standing reflect a “belief that only injury will adequately assure the personal 
stake necessary for vigorous advocacy.”242 But tester standing likely improves 
rather than weakens advocacy, supporting standing despite the lack of a more 
traditional form of injury. 
2. Liberalizing Rules Barring Corporate Ownership of Law Practices 
“Under rules effective throughout the United States, corporations are 
prohibited from law practice ownership.”243 Thus law firms typically are 
partnerships or individuals, and corporations offering financial and personal 
services offer no legal services. In Europe, the supermarket Tesco offers legal 
services: “will writing, do-it-yourself divorce kits, rental agreements, and 
forms for setting up a small company.”244 But American retailers like Target 
cannot “add a legal assistance window next to the banking center or health care 
provider located in its stores”; nor can Google, a leading information provider, 
“take the next step to directly own or invest in a law practice.”245 
Business law scholars argue that barring the basic business form 
(corporations) from a major service field (law) has “created an inefficient legal 
services market[,] . . . limiting [firms’] opportunities for expansion, curtailing 
investments in technology and training, and hindering competition.”246 
Permitting lawyers more versatile corporate forms, and letting corporations 
enter legal markets, advocates claim, could lower costs, thereby “increas[ing] 
access to legal services for moderate and low-income individuals,” as well as 
those in rural areas lacking major law firms; it also could improve the “quality 
of legal services,” because enhanced competition increases incentive “to 
practice law competently.”247 Notably, some legal ethicists agree, calling 
“indefensibly lawyer-centered”248 the corporate bar that “suppress[es] 
competition,” serving only “the interests of ABA control groups.”249 Such 
 
 242 Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 650 (1983). 
 243 Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5 (2012). 
 244 Id. at 40. 
 245 Id. at 7. 
 246 Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer 
Investment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998) (criticizing corporate bar as an inefficient barrier to 
entry); see also Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 792. 
 247 Knake, supra note 243, at 43 (surveying benefits noted by various scholars). 
 248 Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model 
Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 247 (1985). 
 249 Id. at 268. 
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ethicists “suggest corporate ownership and investment in legal services . . . to 
address the dire access-to-justice problem”250 that “[m]illions in need of 
representation cannot afford to hire[,] . . . [or] make an informed decision 
about[,] the best-suited lawyer.”251 
There are substantial counterarguments, however. Corporate ownership 
may weaken norms of client primacy; a corporate-driven lawyer may feel 
pressed to drop still-viable cases or skimp on high-effort motions. Corporate-
provided lawyering also may be less suited for complex cases than for fee-for-
service tasks like wills, evictions, or benefits hearings.252 Yet these arguments 
are not dispositive. Fear of a bottom-line focus applies equally to current law 
practice, given the “economic realities . . . that law practice is a business,” 
already “pressured . . . by competition and technolog[y].”253 Further, for 
complex legal work, corporations can enjoy “economies of scale,”254 mastering 
a field like employment litigation with (a) high demand (given the case 
volume) and (b) high intellectual startup costs for nonspecialists. A corporation 
could dispatch a few supervisory experts to help a fleet of novices outperform 
the now-unaided novices who file doomed low-quality briefs. 
Full appraisal of the corporate ban is beyond this Article’s scope. But the 
ongoing litigated and legislative challenges to the ban255 draw support from 
this Article’s evidence that the current legal services market serves clients 
poorly, making any market-expanding reform possibly worth the risk. 
E. Increasing Enforcement of “Competence” Ethics Rules Against the Worst 
Brief-Writers Litigating Cases Requiring Substantial Briefs 
This Article’s final proposal is that the lawyers who write the worst briefs 
should be discouraged from litigating employment discrimination cases, which 
require writing they are unwilling or unable to do. Courts and state bars largely 
avoid diving into the murk of assessing lawyer “competence,” but this Article 
shows that the problem is substantial enough to reflect rampant violations of a 
core legal ethics rule. ABA Model Rule 1.1, “Competence,” requires as 
 
 250 Knake, supra note 243, at 10–11. 
 251 Id. at 2. 
 252 Id. at 7–8 (noting corporations would be most drawn to “routine legal assistance such as divorce 
filings, wills, real estate transactions, and basic contracts, . . . [and] ‘low-end’ legal service[s], such as 
consumer law and Legal Aid work” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 253 Id. at 42. 
 254 Id. at 45 (noting economies of scale in simpler forms of legal services). 
 255 Id. at 9 (documenting litigatory and legislative attacks in four states). 
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follows: “A lawyer shall provide competent representation . . . . [that] requires 
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary 
for the representation.”256 
Employment discrimination has not previously been, but should be, 
recognized as a field in which nonexperts have heightened obligations either to 
refer a case to an expert, to co-counsel with an expert, or simply to commit to 
careful study that may not be billable to the client.257 “In many instances, the 
required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular 
field . . . may be required in some circumstances.” 258 
[F]actors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the 
matter, the lawyer’s general experience . . . [and] training and 
experience in the field . . . , the preparation and study the lawyer is 
able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer . . . to, or 
associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence . . . .259  
Sanctions or discipline for incompetent briefing would be a change to 
present practice, given the lack of punishment for even the worst briefs cited 
above. But there is support in the professional responsibility caselaw for such 
sanctions. Just as this Article notes that many of the good brief-writers are 
experts in the field while the bad brief-writers typically are not,260 the court in 
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. McClain261 found a competent 
trial lawyer proved an incompetent brief-writer, in violation of Rule 1.1: 
While Respondent’s trial performance skirted the bounds of 
competent representation, his [appellate] representation . . . cannot be 
deemed to have been competent. . . . [H]e presents nothing more than 
legal references and conclusions . . . . not presented in the context of 
facts . . . , nor does he make an effort to apply the law, or invoke 
precedent . . . . [His] reliance on Dorsey and Kelly is misplaced and 
the cases inapplicable, . . . and [he] fail[s] . . . to present a lucid and 
substantial argument . . . . Respondent violated MRPC 1.1.262 
The problem in McClain was not “dishonest or selfish motives, nor . . . 
intent to hurt” his client; rather, it was—as in many of the briefs cited above—
 
 256 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009). 
 257 See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-3 (1980) (noting that an attorney’s study in an 
unfamiliar field of law necessary to a case must not yield “unreasonable delay or expense to his client”). 
 258 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. (1983). 
 259 Id. 
 260 See supra Part III.B.3. 
 261 956 A.2d 135 (Md. 2008). 
 262 Id. at 141. 
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submitting arguments “not supported by the case law, cited or otherwise.”263 
The court in Rowe v. Nicholson264 also found Rule 1.1 violated by failure to 
cite cases: 
[Counsel] fails to acknowledge this Court’s en banc decision in 
Douglas and cites no caselaw in support of his position, which is 
contrary to Douglas. He does not make a specific argument . . . [to] 
overrule Douglas and provides no basis for distinguishing 
Douglas . . . . [P]rofessional obligations [include] to provide 
briefs . . . [with] citation to pertinent and significant authority on the 
issues raised. . . . R. 1.1.265 
Various courts’ practice rules are helpfully more specific than Rule 1.1 in 
detailing brief-writing standards many lawyers violate. Yet only on rare 
occasion do judges expressly criticize a brief and make clear that incompetence 
was the basis for the lawyer’s loss. In Sekiya v. Gates,266 a Ninth Circuit panel 
took the unusual step of publishing a decision declaring as follows: “We strike 
Sekiya’s opening brief in its entirety pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 28-1 and 
dismiss the appeal. We publish this opinion as a reminder that material 
breaches of our rules undermine the administration of justice and cannot be 
tolerated.”267 The employment discrimination plaintiff’s brief that the Sekiya 
court derided as “a slubby mass of words rather than a true brief’”268 was no 
worse than the many briefs this Article cites: 
[C]ounsel must provide . . . “appellant’s contentions and the reasons 
for them, with citations to the authorities and . . . the record . . . .” 
[Plaintiff] challenges the district court’s conclusion on summary 
judgment . . . . by asserting that Plaintiff–Appellant disagrees and . . . 
assert[ing] facts without adequate citation to the record . . . . [or] 
caselaw[,] fall[ing] far short of the requirement [of] . . . “appellant’s 
contentions and the reasons for them.”269 
In sum, there is precedent for disciplining attorney writing bad enough to 
fail basic professional standards.270 Yet not even the worst briefs this Article 
 
 263 Id. at 144. 
 264 No. 05-222, 2007 WL 1470305 (Ct. Vet. App. Apr. 26, 2007). 
 265 Id. at *6. 
 266 508 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 267 Id. at 1199–200. 
 268 Id. at 1200 (quoting N/S Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 1145, 1146 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 269 Id. (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 28) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 270 In addition to the above cases, see, for example, Gardner v. Investors Diversified Capital, Inc., 805 F. 
Supp. 874, 875 (D. Colo. 1992) for a dismissal without leave to amend plaintiff’s amended complaint that was 
“replete with misspellings, grammatical aberrations, non sequiturs and solecisms.” See also, e.g., In re 
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studied drew discipline, even though it is impossible to square such briefs with 
ethical mandates to represent clients competently and know key applicable 
law. 
Bar discipline can disincentivize lawyers from another unethical practice: 
dropping a case unilaterally by filing a hopeless, low-effort brief. As noted 
above, one explanation of bad briefs is that some lawyers pursue the litigation-
as-option strategy: filing many cases of weak to middling strength; then, 
during pretrial, dropping all but the few that prove strong after limited-cost 
discovery.271 But with civil procedure, court, and ethics rules barring lawyers 
from unilaterally dropping cases, a low-effort brief on summary judgment is a 
way of effectively forfeiting cases a lawyer deems unprofitable. Discipline for 
blatantly low-effort briefs therefore draws support from the reality that 
knowingly filing a weak, low-effort brief evades multiple rules against 
unilaterally dropping cases. 
Disciplinary measures likely depend on the judges adjudicating these cases, 
because other actors lack the ability to make credible reports: bar authorities 
lack information on court filings absent a credible report of malfeasance; 
clients too often lack knowledge of poor writing performance; and opposing 
counsel, though well positioned to spot an adversary’s malfeasance, would risk 
looking tactical or manipulative by filing a complaint that an opponent was 
unethical. Judges, moreover, are lawyers facing the Rule 8.3(a) ethical duty to 
“inform the appropriate professional authority” upon learning “that another 
lawyer has committed a violation of the [ethics] Rules . . . that raises a 
substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer.”272 Based on this Article’s findings, judges should consider fulfilling 
that duty more aggressively when presented a litigation filing like the worst of 
the briefs this Article studies. 
 
Hawkins, 502 N.W.2d 770, 770–72 (Minn. 1993) (reprimanding publicly  a lawyer and ordering him to attend 
remedial instruction given “his repeated filing of documents rendered unintelligible by numerous spelling, 
grammatical, and typographical errors”); In re Marriage of Green, 213 Cal. App. 3d 14, 29 (1989) (ordering 
appellant to pay appellee’s legal fees because of “the slap-dash quality of [his] briefs”); Slater v. Gallman, 339 
N.E.2d 863, 864–65 (N.Y. 1975) (imposing costs for filing “an extreme example” of a “poorly written and 
excessively long brief[], replete with . . . irrelevant[] and immaterial matter”). 
 271 See supra notes 166–72 and accompanying text. 
 272 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2009). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article’s finding, that employment discrimination plaintiffs’ briefs are 
overwhelmingly low-quality, adds to several lines of scholarship. First, it helps 
explain why plaintiffs have such a high loss rate on summary judgment. 
Without taking sides as to other causes, one cause is plaintiffs’ defaults on key 
issues (like the same-actor defense), which generate more pro-defense caselaw 
(like the summary judgment grants crediting the defense that follow bad 
plaintiffs’ briefs). 
Second, this Article’s findings provide support to controversial reform 
proposals that had not previously focused on briefing quality. In pinpointing 
work lawyers do badly, this Article supports expanding experiential learning 
and bar efforts to educate lawyers in specialty areas. In concluding that clients 
make poorly informed choices among lawyers, this Article supports 
liberalizing ethics rules on lawyer expertise claims and improving access to 
searchable dockets. In diagnosing a disturbing prevalence of incompetent 
lawyers, this Article supports liberalizing restrictions on who can practice in 
the field, including “tester” standing restrictions and rules barring corporate 
ownership of law practices. Finally, in finding that even the worst briefs go 
unredressed, this Article supports strengthened enforcement of “competence” 
ethics rules. 
Third, this Article exploits a novel methodology not previously available to 
legal scholars. With federal court adoption of e-filing by the mid-2000s only 
very recently yielding enough years of textually searchable filings for a large 
sample size, scrutiny of the content of court filings is a potentially substantial 
new field for academic study. Future potential work includes studying the 
following: 
• other employment discrimination filings (e.g., complaints); 
• defense briefs, which (as noted above) are harder to assess 
objectively than whether responsive briefs (like plaintiffs’) fail 
to rebut a point; 
• briefs in other areas of law (e.g., antitrust) or on other types of 
motions (e.g., class action certification motions); and 
• lawyer filings in criminal defense, in which the ineffective 
assistance of counsel defense273 long has sparked debate about 
 
 273 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984) (holding that an objective standard of 
reasonableness and of impact on outcome apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims). 
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the cause, the prevalence, and even the definition of low-
quality lawyering.274 
More broadly, legal work has become easier to search and study, allowing 
reform prescriptions tailored to identified problem areas—such as researching 
and writing briefs on complex topics like employment discrimination. 
 
 
 274 See, e.g., Jahaan Shaheed, The “Amorphous Reasonable Attorney” Standard: A Checklist Approach to 
Ineffective Counsel in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 905, 905 (2011). 
